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ABSTRACT 
 
The mountain of criticisms leveled against the microfinance project is largely founded on the claim that 
microfinance institutions (MFIs) are unethically making egregious profits from the sweats and in the 
name of poor people. Both the pro and critical literature unanimously point to the fact that the industry 
is financially viable – they only part ways on who benefits from the profit. The taken position of this 
study to investigate what drives commercial MFIs into bankruptcy therefore clearly contradicts received 
wisdom. How could institutions seen as making profits (critics even say excessively) be at the same 
time running to Chapter 11? Is it the case that the MFIs do not experience profit as claimed? Could it be 
commercialization sowing its own seed of destruction? Or it is about management and governance 
and/or different factors including regulation? 
 
 
What Drives Commercial Microfinance Institutions into Bankruptcy in Ghana?  
 
vi | P a g e  
 
Table of Contents 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ......................................................................................................................... iii 
DEDICATION ........................................................................................................................................... iv 
ABSTRACT ............................................................................................................................................... v 
LIST OF FIGURES ................................................................................................................................... viii 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................. 1 
Problem Statement .............................................................................................................................. 4 
Research Question .............................................................................................................................. 7 
Sub questions ...................................................................................................................................... 7 
CHAPTER 2: THEORY AND CONCEPTUALIZATION .................................................................................. 9 
Battling for the soul of microfinance: The Institutionalists versus the Welfarists .............................. 9 
Consequences of commercialization ................................................................................................. 11 
Collapse of commercial MFIs ....................................................................................................... 11 
Explaining bankruptcy: Revisiting neoliberals’ arguments with NIE lens ................................... 12 
Conceptualization of the drivers of MFIs into bankruptcy ............................................................... 15 
Competition .................................................................................................................................. 15 
Macroeconomic trends .................................................................................................................. 17 
Governance and management issues ............................................................................................ 17 
Regulation and Supervision .......................................................................................................... 18 
Conceptual framework of drivers of MFIs into bankruptcy ......................................................... 19 
Figure 1: Conceptual framework of drivers of MFIs into bankruptcy .......................................... 20 
CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY................................................................................................................ 22 
Initial research design ....................................................................................................................... 22 
Initial fieldwork—interviews with Bank of Ghana (BoG) staff and the GHAMFIN staff ............... 23 
The new research design ................................................................................................................... 24 
Selection of collapsed MFIs .............................................................................................................. 25 
What Drives Commercial Microfinance Institutions into Bankruptcy in Ghana?  
 
vii | P a g e  
 
Interviews with the former employees of the collapsed MFIS ......................................................... 27 
Field problems and limitations of the study ...................................................................................... 28 
Generalization of findings................................................................................................................. 29 
Personal reflections ........................................................................................................................... 30 
CHAPTER 4: COLLAPSE OF MFIs IN GHANA: WHAT FACTORS ARE AT WORK? ................................... 32 
Section 1: Internal factors ................................................................................................................. 32 
Internal factor 1: Indiscriminate branching ................................................................................... 33 
Internal factor 2: Unsustainable returns to customers ................................................................... 34 
Internal factor 3: Failure to do due diligence ................................................................................ 36 
Internal factor 4: Mismanagement ................................................................................................ 38 
Internal factor 5: Violation of Bank of Ghana rules and guidelines ............................................. 41 
Section 2: External factors ................................................................................................................ 44 
External factor 1: Macroeconomic instability ............................................................................... 44 
External factor 2: ‘Collapse rumours’ leading to panic withdrawals ............................................ 46 
Section 3: The Bank of Ghana (BoG) monitoring challenges .......................................................... 50 
Figure 2: Conceptual framework of drivers of MFIs into bankruptcy in Ghana .......................... 54 
Section 4: What happens to depositors’ funds when MFIs collapse and the rampant collapse of 
MFIs in the Ashanti Region .............................................................................................................. 55 
What happens to depositors’ funds when MFIs collapse? ................................................................ 55 
The pervasiveness of MFIs collapse in the Ashanti Region ............................................................. 57 
CHAPTER 5:  CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................... 59 
Contributions of findings to literature and implications for policy ................................................... 59 
Conclusion ........................................................................................................................................ 63 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ...................................................................................................................................... 66 
 
  
What Drives Commercial Microfinance Institutions into Bankruptcy in Ghana?  
 
viii | P a g e  
 
LIST OF FIGURES  
Figure 1: Conceptual framework of drivers of MFIs into bankruptcy .................................................. 20 
Figure 2: Conceptual framework of drivers of MFIs into bankruptcy in Ghana ................................... 54 
What Drives Commercial Microfinance Institutions into Bankruptcy in Ghana?  
 
1 | P a g e  
 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
According to the World Bank, around two billion people do not use formal financial services and more 
than 50% of adults in the poorest households are unbanked. That a world which has been able to do the 
unimaginable including sending people to Mars has not been able to make it possible for so many people 
to have access to basic things such as bank accounts is disturbing, really. Ross Levine was right. ‘‘We 
are far from definitive answers to the question: Does finance cause growth (Levine, 2005: 3), yet surely, 
financial inclusion could be a key enabler to reducing poverty and boosting prosperity1.   
 
The movement to bring financial services to the doorstep of the financially excluded through 
microfinance is therefore commendable. However, it is equally important that we highlight the 
disturbing development implications of microfinance on developing countries.  Roodman could not have 
put it any better: “Microfinance has been growing for 35 years and now reaches upwards of 100 million 
people, who cannot all be wrong in their judgments about the utility of microfinance…Nevertheless, the 
recent travails are signs that something is wrong in the industry.” (Roodman, 2013: 7). For the industry 
to mature, the imbalances it has created need to be critically interrogated for there is much to gain from 
successes, crises and failures alike, not least, the minimization of the possibility of repeating the same 
errors in future.  
 
Originally, microcredit was conceived as the disbursement of tiny loans to the poor, to allow them 
establish an income-generating activity and escape poverty through their own agency (Yunus, 2007). 
Over time, the notion of microcredit broadened first from microcredit into microfinance then into the 
concept of building entire financial systems that serve the poor and low-income populations—financial 
systems that are “inclusive” (Littlefield, Helms & Porteous, 2006). Microfinance advocates argued that 
it was going to deliver important economic and social development outcomes – employment generation, 
poverty reduction, additional income, sustainable ‘bottom-up’ development, empowerment of the poor 
(especially women) and rising community solidarity. It would give the poor access to flexible, 
convenient and affordable financial services, empower and equip them to make their own choices and 
build their way out of poverty in a sustained and self-determined way and on a large scale (UNCDF, 
2005; Littlefield, Morduch & Hashemi, 2003).  Surely, it was the poverty reduction magic wand, which 
all developing countries had been waiting for.
 
Initially, the microfinance project was run with donor and government funds so microloans were 
subsidized. However, the centrality of self-help and individual entrepreneurship to the microfinance 
concept inevitably made it attractive to neoliberal policy makers and right-wing western governments. 
                                                        
1 The World Bank – Financial Inclusion Overview - http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/financialinclusion/overview#1  
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The long-term solution to the ‘problem’ of subsidies in the microfinance sector was found in the idea to 
reconstitute microfinance as a privately-owned, profit-driven business model (Bateman, 2013; 2012; 
2010). Led by the USAID and the World Bank and advocates like Maria Otero and Elizabeth Rhyne2, 
with the likes of Marguerite Robinson3 providing the required intellectual support, the microfinance 
project soon became commercialized4 in the 1990’s beginning with the Grameen Bank.  
 
The whole project of commercializing microfinance was rooted in moving it from the heavily donor-
dependent sector of subsidized operations into one in which MFIs would become competitive, regulated, 
financially self-sufficient and profitable (Dacheva, 2009; Charitonenko & Rahman, 2002; Hattel & 
Halpern, 2002). Thus, the ‘new wave’ microfinance model was marked by competition, regulation and 
profitability. The idea was to open the way to greater access to funds; move the source of capital for 
microfinance from the volatile domain of donors to that of the capital markets. This would increase 
outreach through additional funding and enable MFIs fulfill their mission – expressed as reaching the 
poor, or providing access to financial services to those left out of the normal banking system (Hattel & 
Halpern, 2002; Robinson, 2001; Rhyne, 1998). As was anticipated, as soon as microfinance was 
liberalized, the supply of MFIs increased at heart-stopping rate. Financial NGOs transformed 
themselves into regulated institutions5, commercial banks also began to downscale6 their operations to 
compete with traditional MFIs to ‘serve’ the poor (Dacheva, 2009; Bateman, 2010; 2012; 2013).  
 
However, there is a growing thesis that microfinance is not working as its supporters say it does (Karlan 
& Zinman, 2011; Faraizi, Rahman & McAllister, 2011; Bateman, 2012; 2010; Consa & Paprockia, 2010; 
Stewart et al, 2010). The contention is that studies proving the impact potentials of microfinance do not 
employ rigorous methodologies and that the purported positive impacts varnish in some cases altogether 
and in others pale into insignificance when the data and information are replicated or reanalyzed in a 
more rigorous manner. Mostly, such studies critics argue, employ anecdotal and other inspiring stories 
(Roodman & Morduch, 2014; Duvedack et al, 2011). Today, the frontal charge is that microfinance is 
actually an ‘anti-development’ policy, capable of confining developing countries in a ‘poverty trap’ 
                                                        
2 Maria Otero and Elizabeth Rhyne were with Boston based leading microfinance advocacy body ACCIÓN (see 
Otero/Rhyne 1994). Otero, former President of ACCIÓN, joined the first administration of US President Barrack Obama 
as Under-Secretary of State for Democracy and Global Affairs 
3 Marguerite Robinson was at the now defunct Harvard Institute for International Development. She is the author The 
Microfinance Revolution: Sustainable Finance for the Poor. Washington D.C 
4 Commercialization of microfinance refers to “the movement out of the heavily donor-dependent sector of subsidized 
operations into one in which MFIs are financially self-sufficient and sustained and are a part of the regular (or formal) 
financial system (Dacheva, 2009: 6). It is the application of commercial principles to the deployment of financial services 
to the poor (Hattel. & Halpern, 2002: vii). 
5 This is a prevailing model, applied in all regions of the world. This model started with BancoSol in 1992, and many 
other NGOs have followed this path, converting into financial companies, banks, or specialized financial entities (See 
Hattel & Halpern, 2002). 
6 Downscaling is a situation where formal financial institutions (commercial banks) seek to provide services for poorer 
clients 
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(Bateman, 2010; 2012; 2013). The ‘new wave’ microfinance some studies argue is rather than reducing 
poverty, embedding deprivation, poverty, inequality and backwardness, progressive de-industrialisation 
and informalisation of the local enterprise sectors and economies of developing countries7. To be able 
to generate quick and adequate profits, commercial MFIs are prioritizing quick turnover informal 
microenterprises (survivalist’ forms of self-employment and informal family businesses) over riskier, 
technology-based and more substantive enterprises (enterprises with some modest level of innovation, 
non-local market penetration, higher-value-added operations, economies of scale), whose growth could 
impact positively on longer-term development trajectories. The increased injection of capital into 
microfinance means that it is monopolizing valuable  funds  that  could  otherwise  have  been diverted  
to  the  most  growth-oriented  enterprises and sectors of the economy (Bateman, 2010; 2012; 2013; 
Duvedack et al, 2011).  
 
The above aside, the new wave microfinance model has been associated with usurious interest rates, 
clients’ over-indebtedness, ‘double dip’8, Wall Street-style salaries and bonus payments to MFIs senior 
managements and abusive loan collection practices in most developing countries. The intensified 
scrambling for profit in microfinance has led to “mission drift” where poor people and the very poor 
who supposedly were the original target of the project are being neglected for higher income clients. 
   
One profound irony is that in antithesis to the claim that commercialization or the new wave 
microfinance will lead to self-sustainable MFIs, evidence abound that many MFIs have crumbled9 in 
several parts of the world. Since 2007, the global news about microfinance is marked by collapse of 
MFIs, market meltdowns brought on by individual over-indebtedness, aggressive loan collection 
practices, client abuse, and even suicides (Bateman, 2011). This development coincidentally happened 
in the same year (i.e. 2007) when Sub Saharan Africa “MFIs wrapped up with impressive growth in 
outreach, reaching operational self-sufficiency for the first time” (MIX & CGAP, 2010: 1). This study 
interrogates the contradiction of collapsing commercial MFIs in Ghana – one of the countries in sub-
Saharan Africa where microfinance has been well received.  
  
                                                        
7 See Sinclair 2012, Bateman, 2010; 2011; 2013; Arunachalam, 2011 for detailed accounts of the situation of countries 
like Bolivia, Mexico, Colombia, Peru, India, and Bangladesh. 
8 “Double-dip” refers to borrowing from more than one MFI and or other sources at the same time or taking a loan with 
one MFI to pay off a loan with another MFI 
9 See the case of Nicaragua in Sinclair (2012), that of India in Bateman, (2012) & Arunachalam, (2011) and Bolivia in 
Bateman, (2010); Siwale  & John Ritchie (2011) also presents the case of Zambia. In Cameroon the collapse of an MFI 
nearly caused unrest but for the intervention of the government ( See the Economist 2011: Collapse of microfinance 
institution causes unrest. Marulanda, Fajury, Paredes & Gomez (2010) identified 108 failed MFIs in 19 Latin American 
countries.  
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Problem Statement  
Microfinance is not a new concept in Ghana – the practice for people to save and/or take small loans 
from individuals and groups within the context of self-help in order to engage in small retail businesses 
or farming ventures has always been part of the Ghanaian social structure. According to the Bank of 
Ghana, anecdotal evidence suggests that the Canadian Catholic missionaries probably established the 
first credit union in Africa in Northern Ghana in 1955 (Bank of Ghana, 2007). Like most developing 
countries, Ghana also has bought into the idea of leveraging microfinance interventions to reduce 
poverty, create employment and wealth. For instance, microfinance was integral to Ghana’s Poverty 
Reduction Strategy and the Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers as part of poverty alleviation 
efforts of the government (Yeboah, 2010). In the year 2006, the government established the 
Microfinance and Small Loans Centre (MASLOC)10 as a body responsible for implementing the 
Government of Ghana’s microfinance programmes targeted at reducing poverty, creating jobs and 
wealth. 
 
Over the years, Ghana’s microfinance sector has thrived and evolved into its current state, thanks to 
various financial sector policies and programmes such as the liberalization of the financial sector and 
the promulgation of PNDC Law 328 in 1991. These regulations allowed the establishment of different 
types of non-bank financial institutions, including savings and loans companies, finance houses, credit 
unions, rural and community banks (Sackey, 2015; Yeboah, 2010; Atiase, 2008; Bank of Ghana, 2007; 
Gallardo, 2001). Ghana’s microfinance sector has experienced significant growth in the number of 
players, assets, and deposits. From 2001 –2012, total clients grew at an annual compound rate of 16% 
while deposits grew at 23% and loans at 26%. The total number of clients grew from 3.5 million in 2006 
and 5.5 million in 2010 to over 6.5million by the end of 2012. During this same period, deposit 
mobilization was particularly strong with the average growth rate rising in each 2–year period from 19% 
in 2006–2008 to 30% in 2010–2012 (GHAMFIN, 2014).  
 
As at the end of May 2014, the total assets of MFIs reporting, according to the Bank of Ghana stood at 
GH¢688.45 million. Loans and advances granted by the MFIs amounted to GH¢343.53 million during 
the period. Total deposits mobilized during the period on the other hand stood at GH¢344.75 million 
with borrowings amounting to GH¢186.23 million (Bank of Ghana, 2015). In response to the 
commercialization of microfinance in Ghana, not only have financial NGOs transformed into regulated 
institutions in order to mobilize domestic savings (Atiase, 2008) but also, commercial banks are 
downscaling by creating subsidiaries that concentrate on microfinance services or establishing 
specialized departments that provide microfinance services11.  
                                                        
10 http://www.masloc.gov.gh/1/About-Medium-and-Small-Loans.html  
11 This phenomena has become widespread in Ghana. In 2005 Barclays Bank of Ghana through its microbanking scheme 
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While MFIs are sprouting from all corners of Ghana, they are mostly concentrated in urban areas 
(Yeboah, 2010; Schicks, 2011) and this directly runs counter to the fact that majority of the poor 
population ( who purportedly are the targets) are located in rural Ghana. Even, some MFIs previously 
established in rural areas are relocating their operations to the district and regional capitals12. The 
increasing concentration of microfinance in urban Ghana conforms to the global trend where MFIs for 
profiteering reasons are targeting quick turnover informal microenterprises, which generally are found 
in urban towns. Increased competition means that to be profitable, MFIs need to scale up and target 
clients whose businesses allow them to make quick returns and repayments and in most cases, such 
clients are not the economically active poor.  
 
Just as the suffusing of microfinance by commercial MFIs worldwide has been marked by challenges, 
the situation in Ghana is not different. Some studies indicate that commercialization of microfinance in 
Ghana has already created faulty-lines in the industry marked by among other problems (beside the 
desertion of poor people), clients’ over-indebtedness, and “double dip” (Grammling, 2009; Kappel et 
al., 2010 cited in Schicks, 2011). 
 
In response to rampant collapse and disappearance of MFIs or Susu13 companies and financial service 
providers (as they were then called), the Bank of Ghana moved in to close down a number of such 
financial institutions countrywide in 2008 (Belnye, 2011). But the problem will not go away only to rear 
its head since 2013 in a continual and more devastating manner. In the first quarter of 2013, about thirty 
MFIs collapsed in Ghana due to an alleged inability to “sustain their operations.”14 Later in the year, 
additional twenty also became insolvent, making it fifty15. The number keeps on adding up. Recently, 
one MFI became bankrupt and swindled over 5000 clients16. Many of the customers had saved up 
colossal sums with the MFI. There is no deposit insurance in Ghana, therefore, when MFIs collapse, the 
customers irretrievably lose their working capital, savings and their sources of livelihood – their 
businesses are likely to collapse, which further predisposes them to indebtedness and consequentially, 
                                                        
mobilised about 47 million Ghana Cedis in about 18 months of operation, granted 1.03 million Ghana Cedis to about 
1480 individuals made up of market women, hawkers, hairdressers and other artisans. Barclays Bank is working with 
individual Susu collectors in a scheme called micro-banking, had collected about £23 million and had granted loans to 
the tune of about £500000 in their first 18 months of operation. They further estimated that an amount of about 
£151million could potentially be mobilised in the informal sector. The success of Barclays Bank has spurred other 
universal banks’ interest in microfinance (See Yeboah, 2010). 
12 Rural and Community Banks (RCBs) are increasingly moving into urban areas where they make more profits. The 
urbanisation of rural banks was so widespread that in 1998 the Bank of Ghana reviewed and enforced the rule of limiting 
operations to specific locations (see Yeboah, 2010). 
13 Susu is a local language which means deposits or savings.  
14 MICROCAPITAL BRIEF: Thirty Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) Close in Ghana: http://www.microcapital.org/ : 
The customers, most of whom had huge deposits with those institutions could not get a refund for the owners could either 
not be traced, or where they were traced, they failed to raise the requisite funds to pay the customers 
15 http://thebftonline.com/content/bank-ghana-asked-toughen-microfinance-regulation  
16Lord Winners Microfinance swindles over 5,000 customers 
http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=299140 
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impoverishment. The implication is that microfinance is not only deserting poor people, but also creating 
a new cohort of poor population. The crux of the Institutionalists’ (proponents of the financial system 
approach) call for microfinance to be commercialized was financial viability and self-sustainability of 
microfinance institutions (MFIs). The collapse of profit– accumulating commercial MFIs therefore 
contradicts received wisdom. 
 
Choosing Ghana’s microfinance sector as point of reference to investigate the contradiction of 
collapsing commercial MFIs is justified on grounds that the country’s microfinance sector manifests all 
the trappings of the new wave microfinance–its acclaimed success and its problems. Beside the issue of 
mission drift, increased entry of players, collapse of MFIs, another development associated with 
microfinance globally, which also is profound in Ghana is the issue of financial inclusion.17 Today, aside 
the expansion of microfinance services and growing number of MFIs, the strongest achievement claimed 
for microfinance globally, is that it is making universal financial inclusion possible (Roodman, 2013; 
Andersen, 2009). Financial inclusion is a big issue in Ghana. According to FinScope surveys in 12 
African countries, Ghana has the highest share of the population that is “banked” outside southern 
Africa. When other licensed, formal financial institutions (such as savings and loans and deposit–taking 
MFIs) are included, Ghana and Kenya have the highest participation (41%) in formal financial 
institutions outside southern Africa (GHAMFIN, 2014).  
 
Furthermore, in 2007, the microfinance circles heralded MFIs in Sub Saharan Africa (SSA) for their 
impressive growth in outreach and reaching operational self-sufficiency for the first time (MIX & 
CGAP, 2010). Accordingly, that, commercial MFIs are collapsing in Ghana, one of the spotlight 
microfinance countries in SSA, lauded for giving high-level recognition to the importance and relevance 
of microfinance, by establishing a regulatory framework that support the development of sustainable 
microfinance (Gallardo, 2001) leaves much to be desired. 
  
The semblances in the developments in the global microfinance sector and that of Ghana makes it an 
exemplar for examining what has gone wrong with the neo–liberalization or commercialization of 
microfinance. Again, most studies on the failures of microfinance take their cases from the Asia and 
Latin America (Bateman, 2010; 2012; 2013; Faraizi, Rahman & McAllister, 2011; Consa & Paprockia, 
2010). Whilst microfinance is popular in Africa (obviously because of high incidence of poverty), the 
problems in the sector have been least explored. Moreover, the public needs to have confidence in 
financial institutions to patronize their services, so the collapse of MFIs is therefore a bad press for 
                                                        
17 Financial inclusion refers to the extent to which the financial system includes institutions engaged in “microfinance”–
innovative methodologies, that provide savings, credit, money transfer, insurance and other financial services to lower–
income households and enterprises that typically have little access to commercial banking (GHAMFIN, 2014; Roodman, 
2013; Andersen, 2009; CGAP, 2006). 
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Ghana’s finance sector. In a country whose microfinance penetration to the low-income population is as 
low as 9 percent18, it is bad enough for existing MFIs too to be collapsing. The urgency in the need to 
inquire into why commercial MFIs collapse in Ghana is therefore obvious.  
Research Question 
What drives commercial MFIs into bankruptcy in Ghana? 
Sub questions 
1. Does the problem pertain to MFIs operations and strategies to survive competition or other 
internal factors?   
2. Is it a problem of regulation and supervision and/or other factors external to the MFIs?  
3. What happens to the depositors’ funds when the MFIs go bankrupt?  
The literature on the subject was reviewed to identify possible causal explanations, which were pieced 
together into a conceptual framework. Perspectives were extracted from the New Institutional 
Economics theory to attempt an explanation to why contrary to the Institutionalists’ views, competitive, 
profit– accumulating MFIs could still become self– unsustainable. Originally, the design was to study 
both collapsed and surviving MFIs to ascertain what the collapsed ones did wrong and what the 
surviving ones did and are doing right. However, this design had to be altered on the field due to 
problems encountered in accessing the surviving MFIs. Therefore, the study came to focus on only four 
collapsed MFIs that granted access. Further information was gathered from the Other Financial 
Institutions Supervision Department (OFISD) of the Bank of Ghana and the Ghana Microfinance 
Institutions Network (GHAMFIN) in view of their centrality to the microfinance sector to triangulate 
the information gathered from the four collapsed MFIs. The information gathered from the six 
institutions above through interviews and conversations constituted the primary data for the study. To 
enhance the generalization potential of the findings, secondary sources of information on MFIs in Ghana 
were incorporated in the study.  
 
After a thorough analysis of the information gathered, it was found that similar factors accounted for 
the collapse of the four MFIs selected for this study. Therefore, instead of a case-by-case analysis, I did 
a composite analysis of the four cases. However, strikingly dissimilar factors and events are highlighted. 
The causal factors are grouped into internal and external factors, and the Bank of Ghana monitoring 
challenges.  The internal /institution related factors pertain to the (sub optimal) practices and strategies 
of the MFIs to survive competition and managerial problems, which contributed to the collapse. They 
include the following: Indiscriminate branching, offering of unsustainable returns/products to 
customers, failure to do due diligence, mismanagement and violation of the Bank of Ghana’s rules and 
                                                        
18 Of Ghana’s working-age population below the poverty line, only 9 percent have microloans (See Schicks, 2011) 
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operation guidelines. The unduly risky and costly as well as illegal, unethical and bad managerial 
practices increased the risk levels of the already risky business of providing microfinance services and 
were further compounded by the 2013 macroeconomic instabilities (an external factor), which explains 
why the collapse was mammoth in that year. The other external factor was ‘collapse rumuors’ which 
lead to panic withdrawals. The last causal factor was the oversight and monitoring challenges of the 
Bank of Ghana to identify in advance and nip illegal operations and unethical practices in the bud.   
 
To address the crunchy problem of collapsing MFIs in Ghana and its attendant problems, the study 
recommends a two-pronged strategy. The first one is risk-averting/reduction oriented while the second 
is customer protection oriented.  
 
The thesis is structured as follows: The next chapter presents the methodology of the study in which the 
research design, tools, techniques and procedures employed in gathering the data used to answer the 
research question are discussed. The exact steps, procedures and strategies employed on the field as well 
as the challenges the study encountered have also been thoroughly explained. The third chapter pertains 
to theory and conceptualization and is sub-divided into two parts. The first part discusses the competing 
theoretical argumentations on the commercialization of microfinance, and how the ideological 
propositions of the neoliberal school won the day. In addition, the consequences of commercialization 
are presented in the first part. In the second part, some perspectives of the New Institutional Economics 
theory are extracted to explain bankruptcy – why contrary to neoliberals’ expectation of profitable and 
self-sustainable MFIs, commercial MFIs could collapse. The second part also conceptualizes the drivers 
of MFIs into bankruptcy. They are further condensed into a conceptual framework, which served as the 
guide for the collection of the empirical data. The fourth chapter is where the data for the study are 
presented and analyzed. The analysis/findings are later summarized into a conceptual framework of 
drivers of commercial MFIs into bankruptcy in Ghana. We also analyse in chapter four, the critical issue 
of what happens to depositors’ funds after the collapse of the MFIs as well as the pervasiveness of MFIs 
collapse in the Ashanti Region – the setting of study. In the final chapter, we discuss the contributions 
of the findings to the literature on the subject and the implications for policy and conclude the study 
afterwards.  
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CHAPTER 2: THEORY AND CONCEPTUALIZATION  
Microfinance has changed in a fundamental way. The reality of microfinance has changed; the 
terminology has changed; so too has the discourse; its reputation with the public as well as the ethical 
foundations. What once started as a purely value-driven development aid activity has turned into a new 
field of business in which commercial values seem to play a much larger role. The root of all these 
changes was the desire to move microfinance from the domain of subsidized irregular donors and 
governments funds to that of neoliberal rules so that all MFIs will ‘earn their keep on the market’. The 
justification for this was that MFIs would become financially viable, competitive, sustainable and 
overall, efficient. Moving microfinance to the capital market it was argued, will increase outreach 
through additional funding and enable MFIs fulfill their mission – expressed as reaching the poor, or 
providing access to financial services to those left out of the normal banking system. Influenced by these 
benign motivations, microfinance was commercialized – privately–owned, profit-driven business 
institutions began to invest in the sector. Development NGOs also metamorphosed and joined the ‘new 
wave’ microfinance whilst commercial banks downscaled their operations to serve the poor. 
 
However, it seems the development is rearing something other than the anticipated bird. Some scholars 
argue that the commercialization-driven expansion of microfinance has produced pretty much the 
opposite of what was originally promised by the proponents. This chapter is divided into two parts. The 
first part discusses the competing theoretical argumentations on the commercialization of microfinance 
and how the ideological propositions of the neoliberal school won the day as well as the consequences 
of commercialization. In the second part, we extract some perspectives from the New Institutional 
Economics theory literature to explain bankruptcy – why contrary to neoliberals’ expectation of 
profitable and self-sustainable MFIs, commercial MFIs could collapse. The second part also 
conceptualizes the drivers of MFIs into bankruptcy, which are further summarized into the conceptual 
framework used to guide the empirical data collection. 
 
Battling for the soul of microfinance: The Institutionalists versus the Welfarists 
Elisabeth Rhyne could not have put it any better: “Everyone involved in microfinance shares a basic 
goal: to provide credit and savings services to thousands or millions of poor people in a sustainable 
way” (Rhyne, 1998: 6). However, what sets us apart is the answer to the question: by what means could 
(many) poor people be best served?  
 
Microfinance in the 1990s was marked by a major debate between two leading schools: the financial 
systems approach and the poverty lending approach led by the Institutionalists and the Welfarists 
respectively. Central to the financial systems approach was the argument that among poor people, there 
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was strong demand for small-scale financial services—for both credit and savings, which was unmet 
globally by the then (poverty lending)19 model because of the following and other reasons. First, the 
NGOs and village banks for reasons of capital constraints could meet only a tiny fraction of the demand 
for credit and could not also meet repeat borrowers’ expanding need for larger loans. Second, 
government and donor-financed subsidized credit could not fill the credit gap since the subsidies were 
often siphoned off by local elites and so did not reach the poor. In addition, many such institutions had 
high arrears and large losses. Access by the poor tended to be low, despite the subsidies, and the costs 
of borrowing was also high because of widespread inefficiencies and corruption. The moneylenders and 
formal commercial banks were no options given their neck-cutting interests and the poor lack of 
collateral and credit history (Robin, 2001).  
 
The Institutionalists further contended that the poor are sometimes so desperate for a safe place to store 
their savings that they even pay collectors to hold their deposits safely, thus realizing a negative return 
on their savings. Yet, except where mandatory savings are conditional to receiving loans, the 
mobilization of local savings was normally not a significant part of the poverty lending approach to 
microfinance (Robinson, 2001). Accordingly, the proponents of the financial system approach proposed 
that the sustainable way to fill the credit and savings gap was to liberalize microfinance for MFIs to 
mobilize savings, raise capital commercially and serve clients through extensive branch networks. 
Profitability will significantly attract commercial investors to microfinance. This way, MFIs will 
become financially viable and self-sustainable. Increase in industry profits will increase competition 
that could potentially lower prices for borrowers. This will lead to self-sufficient financial intermediaries 
and large-scale microfinance outreach. Commercial MFIs can also offer the much in- demand savings 
services that provide savers with security, liquidity and returns, which the poor are in dire need of 
(Robinson, 2001; Rhyne, 1998). 
 
The Welfarists (supporters of the poverty lending approach) however rejected the Institutionalists’ 
position arguing that it will in the nutshell, sacrifice poverty reduction for institutional profitability. 
Microfinance will drift from its poverty alleviation mission – wealthy clients for profit purposes will be 
targeted and this will be detrimental to the poor and the poorest of the poor. They argued that MFIs do 
not need to generate profit for private people before they could be sustained since donations and public 
funds could be satisfactorily used to reach the poor without making profit. Donors and governments 
would not worry about this because it is a form of social investment20. 
                                                        
19 The poverty lending approach concentrates on reducing poverty through credit, often provided together with 
complementary services such as skills training and the teaching of literacy and numeracy, health, nutrition, family 
planning, and the like. Under this approach donor- and government-funded credit is provided to poor borrowers, typically 
at below-market interest rates. The goal is to reach the poor, especially the extremely poor—the poorest of the poor—
with credit to help overcome poverty and gain empowerment  
20 See for instance Yunus, (2007) 
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This debate came at a time when neo-liberalization (which repudiates subsidies) was gaining grounds. 
The verdict was that any future that continues dependence on donors and governments is a future in 
which few microfinance clients would be served. Donors and governments, both notably prone to fads, 
are unlikely to continue subsidizing microfinance indefinitely and are not generous enough to do so on 
a major scale. And that the only way to assure access by the poor to financial services was to ensure that 
the private sector finds it profitable to provide such services. Only the private sector has plenty of 
resources and will stick with a moneymaking activity even if it is not in fashion (Rhyne, 1998). The 
proposition of assisting in reducing poverty in developing countries while also diversifying one’s 
portfolio or making profit became appealing to the neoliberal western governments and institutions. Led 
by the USAID and the World Bank, the advocacy for microfinance to be commercialized became 
intensified and saw many countries adopting a liberalized regime. MFIs began to mobilize local savings, 
access commercial debt, for-profit investment, and also use retained earnings to finance their lending.  
 
As discussed elsewhere, while the push for microfinance commercialization was influenced by the idea 
to make MFIs efficient, profitable, and self-sustainable so they could reduce poverty on a wide scale by 
serving more poor people, bring competition to force down the cost of borrowing, later developments 
seem to point to pretty much the opposite. Some of them are noted below. 
 
Consequences of commercialization  
The Institutionalists push for microfinance to be commercialized received resounding support – the way 
to go was for private investors to bring their capital into the sector, compete for profit through 
innovations and cost cutting measures. In this way, MFIs will become financially self-sustainable and 
viable to reach more people at reduced cost. However, as noted earlier, there are concerns that 
commercialization of microfinance is resulting into some unintended consequences which negate its 
intendments, manifesting as “mission drift”, high interest rates, less or no poverty reduction21 and most 
surprisingly, collapse of commercial MFIs.   
 
Collapse of commercial MFIs  
The plank of the front for the commercialization of microfinance was ensuring that MFIs become 
financially viable and financially self-sustainable MFIs. However, the sector has been outraged by 
market meltdowns and collapsing commercial MFIs. Calling on a few studies and reports may be 
                                                        
21 Because of limited space, the discussion on the other unintended consequences of commercialization, i.e. “mission 
drift”, high interest rates, less or no poverty reduction is annexed to this report as Appendix 1. 
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helpful. Sinclair (2012) captures the case of Nicaragua while Bateman (2012) & Arunachalam, (2011) 
espouse on that of India. Bateman (2010) also gives the account of Bolivia. Siwale & Ritchie (2011) 
present a case from Zambia and draw inspiration from places like Morocco. Marulanda, et al (2010) 
studied 108 failed MFIs in 19 Latin American countries. Mago, Hofisi & Mago (2013) share a brief 
insight on the case of Zimbabwe whilst the Economists also in 2011 reported how but for the 
government’s intervention, the collapse of an MFI in Cameroon nearly caused public unrest.  
 
In the section below, we extract some perspectives from the New Institutional Economics (NIE) theory 
literature to explain why contrary to the Institutionalists view, competitive, profit– accumulating MFIs 
could still become self– unsustainable or go bankrupt. 
 
Explaining bankruptcy: Revisiting neoliberals’ arguments with NIE lens   
The mountain of criticisms leveled against the microfinance project is largely founded on the claim that 
MFIs are unethically making egregious profits from the sweats and in the name of poor people. Indeed, 
(both the pro and critical) literature unanimously point to the fact that the industry is seeing huge profits 
(they only part ways on who benefits from the profit). The taken position of this study to investigate 
what drives MFIs into bankruptcy therefore clearly contradicts received wisdom. How could institutions 
seen as making profits (critics even say excessively) be at the same time running to Chapter 11? Is it the 
case that the MFIs do not experience profit as claimed? Could it be commercialization sowing its own 
seed of destruction? Or is about management and governance or different factors including regulation? 
 
The view of the Institutionalists/financial systems approach was celebrated for its emphasis on financial 
and institutional viability. Profitability means covering all costs and risks without subsidy and returning 
surplus to the institution (Robinson, 2001) and this is where institutional self-sustainability comes in. 
By covering all risks and cost of operation and returning some margin of profit, MFIs could sustainably 
deliver services to clients with or without external funds (from donors or government). So how come, 
commercial MFIs could still go bankrupt? Let us turn with profit to the New Institutional Economics 
(NIE) theory to attempt an explanation to this contradiction. 
 
The NIE theory is an interdisciplinary framework that combines economics, law, organization theory, 
political science, sociology and anthropology to understand the institutions of social, political and 
commercial life. NIE borrows liberally from various social-science disciplines, but its primary language 
is economics. Its goal is to explain what institutions are, how they arise, what purposes they serve, how 
they change and how - if at all – they should be reformed22. NIE has grown rapidly over the last three 
                                                        
22 According to the International Society for New Institutional Economics: http://www.isnie.org/about.html 
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decades since Oliver Williamson first coined the term in 1975. Broadly, the theory argues that the 
process of institutional development, and  the  evolution  of  associated  organizational  models,  is  
largely contingent  upon  a  complex  interplay  of  economics,  politics,  ideology, self-interest, ethics 
and the exercise of power (Bateman, 2010; Parada, 2002; Zimbauer, 2001). 
 
Unlike neoclassical economics who ignore institutions or take them as given23, NIE takes institutions 
seriously just as Original Institutional Economics (OIE) does. However, while the evolution of 
institutions in OIE is based more on an evolutionary approach24, NIE contends that institutions or 
organizational models are purposefully created by and to serve the interest of the economically and 
politically powerful. Therefore even “bad” institutions and organizational models will often be allowed 
to survive, and may even be encouraged as long as the interests of the powerful are served (Bateman, 
2010). 
 
According to the NIE, the role of institutions in a society is to reduce uncertainty by establishing a stable 
structure to human interaction (Ménard & Shirley, 2008; North, 1990). However, the structure may “not 
necessarily [be] efficient” (North, 1990:6). This is so because “institutions are a mixed bag of those that 
induce productivity and those that reduce productivity [and] institutional change likewise almost always 
creates for both types of activities” (p.9). Accordingly, the organizational models that develop in this 
institutional framework can become more efficient at making the society even more unproductive and 
the basic institutional structure less conducive to productive activity. 
 
Such a path North (1990) argues can “persist [if] the transaction costs of the political and economic 
markets of those economies together with the subjective models of the actors do not lead them to move 
incrementally towards more efficient outcomes” (p.9). This is so because institutional constraints result 
in particular exchange organizations that come into existence because of the incentives embodied in the 
framework and therefore depend on it for the profitability of the activities that they undertake. This will 
mean that actors in a common market are likely for profiteering reasons to resort to suboptimal practices 
even when such an enterprise could have demising effect on the market on which they all operate and 
so seems to be the case with the “new wave” microfinance model.  
 
Privately-owned and profit-driven businesses beginning from the 1990’s replaced donors and 
governments and brought their abundant resources into microfinance. Microfinance was thus 
                                                        
23 In sum, neoclassical economics tends to ignore institutions in its theoretical framework, however, in the last decade it 
has tried to incorporate them from a game theoretical perspective (See Parada, 2002: pp. 47 – 49 & Zimbauer, 2001  for 
a detailed discussion of NIE, OIE and neoclassical economics perspectives on institutions) 
24 As suggested by Veblen’s view of the Darwinian analogy (that the most efficient institutions or organizational models 
will emerge and be sustained over time  
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commercialized – profiteering was sanctioned to attract investments from the private sector. In this way, 
MFIs will charge market rate interests, cover fully, their costs of operation, make profits and become 
potent to sustainably provide microfinance services to a lot of poor people on a wide scale (see Rhyne, 
1998; Robin, 2001).  
 
However, rather than becoming self-sustainable, as noted earlier, evidence of bankrupt MFIs abound 
worldwide. The neoliberal principles that informed the new wave microfinance model had taken it for 
default that the egressing of donors and governments from microfinance and the entry of privately 
owned, profit-driven businesses would create efficient MFIs. However, as asseverated by the NIE, while 
the bag of institutions/models comes with factors/activities that induce productivity, it also contains 
those that reduce productivity as well and this nature of institutional composition is unalterable by 
institutional/model change. In fact, it usually creates for both types of activities. Thus, adopting a new 
organizational model does not by default lead to efficiency.  
 
The competition and profitability that the neoliberals had envisaged to be the driving forces of the new 
wave microfinance model’s efficiency rather will become its Achilles heel. Robinson was right, with the 
advent of the new wave microfinance model, “for the first time in history— [there is increased] 
competition for the business of low-income clients” (Robinson, 2001: 29). However, as thoroughly 
discussed under the competition section in the conceptualization part of this work (below), the MFIs 
compete for the same pool of homogeneous clients and mostly their projects are copycats 
(undiversified). To survive competition, each MFI becomes increasingly eager to carve its lion share of 
an already saturated market. Hence, they together tend to reduced lending standards, which make them 
willing to forego basic risk reduction practices - “dilution of due diligence standards” (CSFI, 2014: 34).  
 
Suboptimal practices like MFIs indiscriminate disbursement of loans without proper evaluation of 
client’s debt capacity, mainly driven by competition for profit25 leads to clients’ inter or over-
indebtedness – the reason for the near collapse of the Nicaraguan microfinance sector in 2009/2010. 
This is consistent with the NIE forceful argument that “institutional constraints” (and here MFIs 
constraints to cover full cost of operation, make profit and survive competition) do not lead market 
actors to move incrementally towards efficient outcomes (North, 1990).  
 
The neoliberals had pushed microfinance from the domain of donors and governments to that of 
privately-owned, profit-driven businesses, with the view of baiting the private sector with profit making 
opportunities so they will channel their inexhaustible pool of resources into microfinance. By covering 
all risks, cost of operation and returning some margin of profit, MFIs could sustainably deliver services 
                                                        
25 The more loans an MFI disburses, the more profit it accrues 
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to more poor people than the measly subsidized volatile funds of donors and governments could do. 
 
However, as pointed out with the NIE lens, the neoliberals view carries in its belly two-pronged 
problematic foregrounds. First, while the subsidization of microfinance services with donors and 
governments funds may not be self-sustainable, this problem does not abate with replacing donors and 
governments with privately owned market driven institutions designed to respond, not to genuine human 
needs, but to effective demand (i.e. demand backed up by purchasing power). Second, consistent with 
the NIE assertion that when incentives are embodied in profitability, actors could be led towards 
inefficient outcomes, the profiteering incentives that came with the neoliberals ‘new wave’ microfinance 
model has led to the pursuit of suboptimal practices on the part of MFIs. 
 
The combined effect of these problematic foregrounds has been that upon commercialization, rather 
than MFIs becoming self-sustainable, in consistent with the neoliberals claims, increasingly, MFIs 
globally are facing market meltdowns brought on by individual over-indebtedness, aggressive loan 
collection practices, client abuse, and even suicides. The NIE theory would be employed in the analytical 
section to explain how collectively, competitive quest for profit on the part of MFIs in Ghana drove all 
of them into bankruptcy.  
 
Conceptualization of the drivers of MFIs into bankruptcy 
 This section attempts to conceptualize what drives MFIs into bankruptcy. Pieces of arguments from the 
literature are pierced together with the view of furthering understanding on how commercial MFIs could 
rather collapse. The conceptualization was done under the four headings below: competition, 
macroeconomic trends, governance and management and regulation and supervision.  
 
Competition 
The liberalization of microfinance was intended to bring into the sector more players who will need to 
compete for profit and clients, and will therefore need to inter alia innovate, diversify products and 
segment clients. In the nutshell, MFIs will become efficient in their operations and this will reduce the 
cost of borrowing for clients. However, competition has consistently featured in the industry’s own 
reports as having adverse impact on MFIs (see CSFI, 2008; 2010; 2012; 2014). The facts are that 
commercial banks, moneylenders and consumer finance companies are taking advantage of low entry 
barriers to move into MFIs territory with aggressive, well-funded campaigns, bringing market forces to 
bear on hitherto sacrosanct lending margins. MFIs are also competing more strongly among themselves. 
As Robinson (2001) rightly noted, for the first time in history there is increased competition for the 
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business of low-income clients. The MFIs compete for the same pool of clients and mostly their projects 
are copycats (undiversified). Because of increased eagerness to carve market shares for themselves in 
an already saturated market, MFIs tend to reduced lending standards, which make them willing to forego 
basic risk reduction practices or dilute due diligence standards (CSFI, 2014). The increased number of 
players providing identical products to homogeneous clients based on reduced lending standards do not 
only squeeze margins but also increase risk thereby undermining operating standards and eroding 
profitability. A high growing risk profile and decreasing profit margins obviously will threaten 
institutional sustainability.  
 
An alternative way of understanding how competition could cause MFIs to collapse is through the too 
much capital approach. As noted by the industry players themselves, “excess funding can create as much 
risk as shortage. The flood of money pouring into the sector is stirring up irrational exuberance and 
undermining discipline” (CSFI, 2012: 28). It is worthy of note that MFIs are not able to control loan 
disbursements by their competitors. This makes abundant availability of “cheap” credit to clients. 
Especially, as competition increases, having access to a multitude of microfinance providers will remove 
the deterrence of strategic default that a monopolistic MFI enjoys, portfolio qualities could decline 
subsequently. With or without predatory lending, rational borrowers could be tempted to make use of 
cheap credit available from several MFIs who in the first place have no control on the lending practices 
of their competitors (Andersen, 2009).  
 
Borrowers will thus resort to “double-dip” and consequently become inter-indebted (over-indebted) to 
almost all operating MFIs by borrowing from one MFI to settle loans contracted from the other and vice 
versa till a time when the cycle cannot be sustained anymore. When the bubble finally bursts, the 
numerous borrowers who are inter-indebted or over-indebted to the MFIs will default on their debts and 
all the MFIs involved will be screwed. A practical development that has all the trappings of this 
explanation is the 2009/2010 “no pago”26 crisis in Nicaragua, which brought the country’s microfinance 
sector on its knees, virtually.   
                                                        
26 The MFIs lent at high interest rates indiscriminately to borrowers who also inter-borrowed. Borrowers were taking 
money from MFIs to settle loans contracted from their competitors. This continued until the borrowers became incapable 
of paying back the loans in 2009/2010. A kite-maker in Jalapa is on record to have accumulated a total debt of $600,000 
and was owing all the 19 MFIs. So the borrowers collectively defaulted on their debts and the MFIs suffered a profound 
crisis. (See a detailed account in Sinclair (2012) and also: https://nacla.org/news/no-pago-confronts-microfinance-
nicaragua ) 
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Macroeconomic trends 
Hitherto the global financial crisis, it was widely argued that the localized nature of microfinance tends 
to insulate it from wider economic trends: “MFIs operate in a market that depends more on 
microeconomic conditions than macro fluctuations”27 (CSFI, 2008:30). However, the aftermath of the 
global economic crisis has turned upside down this conventional view – after all, MFIs do not inhabit 
their own business world. MFIs no longer are insulated from shocks in the “real economy” – there are 
too many links through financial markets, credit conditions and the fortunes of their customers (CGAP, 
2009; CSFI, 2009; 2010). MFIs operate in a market that depends more on microeconomic conditions 
than macro fluctuations, yet macro trends affect everything. There is an increasing understanding that 
microfinance also have become more vulnerable to the ups and downs of global markets and to the 
policies adopted by governments to deal with them. This risk does not only affect microfinance services 
providers directly through interest rates and general business conditions, but also it most often reaches 
them indirectly –  through clients who have been hit by economic difficulty or retreat from buying 
financial services (CSFI, 2014).  
 
That big financial institutions at Wall Street could be affected by macroeconomic trends effectively 
dismisses the fertility of the claim that microfinance providers with good credit risk systems and quality 
portfolios could be resistant to market trends28. Indeed, even small macro-economic changes can have 
a huge impact on the lives of millions (CSFI, 2009) and such people as noted earlier could pass this as 
a risk onto MFIs as clients. Accordingly, in times of macroeconomic instabilities such as high rates of 
lending and inflation, the self-sustainability of MFIs could adversely be impacted. 
 
Governance and management issues 
Commercialization (and obtaining funding on commercial terms) along with competition for both 
funding and clients, require inter alia an effective management of cost structures to ensure sufficient 
returns to pay for the more expensive commercial funds. This includes managing effectively the risks 
associated with rapidly expanding loan portfolios and increased scope of operation; hence, good 
corporate governance becomes very critical to achieving institutional financial viability and self-
sustainability (Andersen, 2009).  
 
However, among microfinance practitioners, poor risk management and corporate governance (a key 
area to mitigate risks) have been widely noted (CSFI, 2008; 2009; 2010; 2012; 2014). Already, 
                                                        
27 Marcelino San Miguel, President of Fundacion San Miguel Arcangel in the Dominican Republic 
28 Some Microfinance practitioners argue that markets can be affected, microfinance providers with good credit risk 
systems and quality portfolios should be resilient (See CSFI, 2014: 49). 
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microfinance goes with high risk and operation cost in view of their target clients. However, instead of 
keeping cost under control, most MFIs rather pursue activities that increase cost – indiscriminate 
establishment of branches, hiring of staff merely to satisfy “business ego” rather than for economic or 
business reasons, payment of fat bonuses and salaries to senior managers, purchasing and servicing of 
luxurious vehicles that are not meant for operations, excessive expenditure on advertisements.29 In some 
cases, some MFIs fund these investments with depositors’ funds30. The problem is not only about the 
mostly non-economic significance of such costly investments but also, they lead to situations where 
such capital investments compete with available funds for on-lending purposes. Surely, such MFIs are 
bound to experience serious liquidity challenges since loans and advances are the main sources of 
income for MFIs. 
 
Another perspective of looking at the governance and management issue is this: The liberalization of 
microfinance attracts capital from all private people including those bereft of the required governance 
and managerial knowledge, experiences and competence to manage an MFI or be on an MFI board. Any 
MFI with people who lack the managerial qualifications or experiences31 to handle difficult business 
conditions in its administrative echelon is bound to give in to the weighty demands of risky and complex 
business of microfinance and collapse. 
 
Regulation and Supervision 
An MFI can commercialize in a number of ways. One is to transform a non-profit entity into a 
formalized, regulated financial institution that can, if so licensed, intermediate deposits from the public. 
A second is to create a commercial MFI from scratch. A third path to commercialization in microfinance 
is for traditional banks to become involved in microfinance (Ledgerwood & White, 2006). Save the 
traditional banks, which generally have sufficient capital, office location and large client base and could 
commercialize easily, in respect of the other two routes to commercialization, such potential institutions 
need to fulfil many important requirements before they can take-off. They need to demonstrate some 
level of equity (required by the central bank), security of deposit and insurance, have adequate staff and 
standard office space, a well-functioning IT system and vehicles to monitor operations.  
 
Thus, commercialization comes with huge cost in terms of investments in physical structures, human 
                                                        
29 See Sinclair, (2012) or Bateman (2011; 2010) for more of such non-economic investments MFIs undertake. 
30 Read the accounts of Sinclair (2012) on an MFI in Nigeria called LAPO used depositors funds in a similar manner 
albeit, illegally. 
31 Relevant expertise and experiences have been noted at all levels as fundamental to quality of risk management and 
corporate governance (See CSFI, 2008; 2009; 2010; 2012; 2014) 
 
What Drives Commercial Microfinance Institutions into Bankruptcy in Ghana?  
 
19 | P a g e  
 
and capital resources and machinery. In view of the huge cost involved, coupled with the mouthwatering 
opportunities immanent in operating a MFI commercially, profit-seeking people could easily be tempted 
to cut corners in order to quickly and easily establish MFIs. And this is entirely possible especially in 
the developing world where regulatory and supervisory institutions are weak and hence venal. (Even 
the whole FED, US could only see the coming of the financial crisis after the fact). Without the required 
structures and capital base, such MFIs are highly likely to become insolvent when they begin to operate. 
  
Similarly, commercialization comes with the requirement to comply with the related regulations, which 
add significant and often unexpected cost to the operations of the MFI. In fact, Ledgerwood & White 
have reported that “in some cases, transformed MFIs have underestimated this change to such an extent 
that once operating as a licensed institution they have admitted that had they known the extent and cost 
of compliance, they would never have transformed” (Ledgerwood & White, 2006: 70). Although such 
MFIs might initially have duly met the set criteria to commercialize, the exigencies of additional 
operation and other unexpected costs are likely to prevail upon them to resort to unethical and dubious 
cost cutting practices. Such practices could only be uncovered and stopped where supervision and rules 
enforcement is the order of the day. Save this, eventual collapse of such MFIs will always loom large.  
 
Talking about inadequate regulation and supervision and or its lack thereof, it is also argued in some 
quarters’ that too much regulation could also be detrimental. Microfinance practitioners and neoliberal 
apostles vehemently complain about this in many circles (see CSFI, 2014; 2008; 2009). In the wake of 
the crisis, the microfinance sector has seen torrent of new regulations intentioned to strengthen it. 
However, there is a growing view that “the cumulative effect of all the regulatory initiatives could have 
an inadvertent permanently damaging effect on the industry’s profitability” (CSFI, 2010: 14). Could this 
explain why some MFIs are running to Chapter 11?  
 
Conceptual framework of drivers of MFIs into bankruptcy  
The framework below is a diagrammatic representation of drivers of MFIs into bankruptcy teased out 
from the literature. As depicted, commercialization is marked by competition for profit and regulation 
of the activities of MFIs. The seek for profit has not only led to the establishment of several MFIs but 
also people without any knowledge on how to run MFIs have also entered the sector and this comes 
with management and governance problems. The management problems fuelled by the exigencies of 
competition, manifest in poor decisions like indiscriminate branching, disregard for due diligence, 
needless costly advertisements which increase the risk profiles of MFIs and lead to their eventual 
collapse.  
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The other leg of the argument is that the MFIs do not only compete for the same pool of homogenous 
clients, their products and services are homogenous (copycats) as well. Fuelled by increased eagerness 
to carve large market shares for themselves in an already saturated market, they tend to unethical 
practices, which make them willing to forego basic risk reduction practices. The increased number of 
players providing identical products to clients who are homogenous based on reduced lending standards 
do not only squeeze margins but also increase risk thereby undermining operating standards and eroding 
profitability. A high growing risk profile and decreasing profit margins obviously will threaten 
institutional sustainability.  
Figure 1: Conceptual framework of drivers of MFIs into bankruptcy 
 
Source: Created by author. 
 
In respect of regulation and supervision, in cases where it is low or poor, people could take legal and 
other requirements for granted in establishing MFIs. Forfeiture of structural requirements in establshing 
an MFI adds extra risk to the already risky microfinance business. As the framework depicts, such MFIs 
may not survive. On the other hand in cases where the regulatory requirements are high, profit seeking 
people could easily be tempted to cut corners in order to quickly and easily establish MFIs. Without the 
required structures and capital base, such MFIs are also highly likely to become insolvent when they 
begin to operate. Taken together, the cumulative effect of regulatory initiatives could also have an 
inadvertent damaging effect on institutional sustainability.  
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As also discussed elsewhere, there is an increasing understanding that microfinance also have become 
more vulnerable to the vicissitudes of global markets and to the policies adopted by governments to deal 
with them. This risk does not only affect MFIs directly through interest rates, currency depreciation and 
general business conditions, but also it most often reaches them indirectly – through clients who have 
been hit by economic difficulty or retreat from buying financial services. Accordingly, as indicated in 
the framework, in times of macroeconomic instabilities such as high rates of lending and inflation, the 
self-sustainability of MFIs could adversely be impacted.  
 
The chapter reviewed the ideological underpinnings of the debate between the Institutionalists and the 
Welfarists on making microfinance sustainable and a thoroughgoing poverty reduction methodology. 
Perspectives were extracted from the NIE literature to explain why profit accumulating commercial 
MFIs could still go bankrupt in antithesis to the Institutionalists claim that commercialization would 
rather make MFIs financially viable and self-sustainable. In the conceptualization section, we discussed 
how factors like competition among MFIs, macroeconomic trends, poor governance and 
mismanagement as well as regulation and supervision issues could affect institutional sustainability. Are 
they the same factors that are at work in Ghana? The focus of this study is to benchmark these generic 
factors to examine the drivers of MFIs into bankruptcy in Ghana. The next chapter discusses the 
methodology of the study.  
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY  
 
The ultimate aim of this study was to examine what drives commercial MFIs in Ghana into bankruptcy. 
The study sought to answer the research question in the light of the NIE theory. Commercialization of 
microfinance came at the back heel of the Institutionalists’ claim that with the glide away of volatile 
donors’ and subsidized governments’ funds from microfinance, and the entry of privately-owned, profit-
driven businesses, MFIs will become efficient, profitable and self–sustainable. Essentially, what the 
Institutionalists sought to put forward was that since governments and donors were not going to eternally 
channel funds into microfinance, adopting a new model to attract private investments from private 
people will bring competition, profitability and create self– sustainable MFIs. Thus, changing the model 
of microfinance from donor–government funded to private–funded would concomitantly bring 
efficiency.   
 
However, as shown in the previous chapter, the very same competition and profitability that the 
neoliberals envisaged to be the engines of the new wave microfinance model’s efficiency rather have 
become its Achilles heel. How do we explain this contradiction? The Institutionalists had applied 
themselves to only one side of the coin– that, competition for profit will lead to innovation and optimal 
practices. What lost on them but has been well noted in the NIE literature is the acknowledgment that, 
actors in a common market are likely to (for this same profiteering reasons) resort to suboptimal 
practices, even if such an enterprise could have demising effect on the market in which they all operate 
(see North, 1990).  
 
Having discussed the theory and concepts, in this chapter, we explain how we are going to study them 
and the data to be used as well as the people from whom the data was collected.  
 
Initial research design 
Originally, I sought to do a comparative study by examining both functioning and collapsed MFIs to 
find out what the surviving MFIs did right and what the collapsed ones did wrong. However, at the field, 
this design had to be dropped because of difficulties in getting access to the functioning MFIs. Most of 
the MFIs in Ghana do not have websites where their contact information could be accessed online. In 
the case of the collapsed MFIs, even if they had, once they had collapsed, the contacts were obviously 
not going to be active. Additionally, the phenomena of institutions responding to email enquiries is not 
common in Ghana. One therefore has to be physically present to ask for permission and information 
when conducting empirical studies about Ghana. In view of the above difficulties, I could not secure 
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contacts with potential institutions for the study from my base in Denmark until I got to Ghana. 
 
I had a short period of 6 weeks to seek both permissions and collect the needed information from the 
institutions. I contacted six functioning MFIs to conduct the study with them but my requests were not 
granted. The increased bad press on microfinance in Ghana made the institutions hesitant to open up for 
studies. Their response to my persistent calls and follow-ups was the usual refrain: “Your application is 
being considered; you will hear from us”. In the case of the former employees of the collapsed MFIs, 
after the collapse of their institutions, customers who had their deposits with them have been chasing 
them for refund of their money. Therefore, they have become unwilling to open up to anybody on their 
former institutions, suspecting that such people could be disguised customers searching for their 
whereabouts to disgrace them. Getting access to them for interviews therefore was very difficult. I had 
to find people in their networks – close friends and relatives to lead me to them.  
 
Contemporaneously, both the former employees of the collapsed MFIs and the functioning ones were 
being pursued persistently with calls and visitations. I had more success in accessing the former 
employees, despite all the challenges there, than with the functioning MFIs. Once, people close to them 
introduced me, they became trustful of me and granted the interviews subsequently, but only after a long 
period of bonding and persistent calls. This explains why the research design was altered to focus on 
only the former employees of the collapsed MFIs. The relative easiness with getting access to the former 
employees of the collapsed MFIs compared to the functioning ones may be explainable by the fact that 
the former do not have institutional allegiance anymore to be accountable to them.  
 
Initial fieldwork—interviews with Bank of Ghana (BoG) staff and the GHAMFIN staff 
In Ghana, among other functions, the BoG has overall supervisory and regulatory authority in all matters 
relating to banking and non-banking financial business including awarding license of operation to all 
financial institutions32. In response to its widening supervision and monitoring duties, in August 2013, 
the Bank established the Other Financial Institutions Supervision Department (OFISD) to be in charge 
of rural banks, forex bureaus and MFIs. I contacted the OFISD for this study obviously because of its 
role in the microfinance sector of Ghana as the regulator. I wrote to the OFISD requesting to conduct 
the study with them. In Ghana, whilst verbal application may sometimes be granted, the practice is that 
such request has to be formally applied by writing. I followed up to inquire about my application after 
some days of no response. Although my request was yet to receive approval officially, I was granted 
audience. As I was discussing my work with two employees of the Department, other personnel of the 
Bank took interest in the subject and joined the discussion. Therefore, it eventually became a 
                                                        
32 http://www.bog.gov.gh/  
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spontaneous focus-group discussion with five staff of the Department. This conversation defined the 
study’s design. It was through this conversation that I learnt that it is in the Ashanti Region of Ghana 
that MFIs collapse most. This is why I chose the Region as the setting of the study. Some days later, the 
officer assigned to my study emailed me a written response to the questions in the interview guide I sent 
them. I later contacted him by phone to further discuss grey issues33 that emerged from my interviews 
with the collapsed MFIs.   
 
From the Bank of Ghana, I went to the office of the Ghana Microfinance Institutions Network 
(GHAMFIN). The GHAMFIN is the umbrella network body for the MFIs that operate in Ghana. It was 
formed in 1998 as a company limited by guarantee with the support of the World Bank because of 
concerns of some Ghanaian MFIs for the development of best practices in the delivery of microfinance 
services (GHAMFIN, 2014). The GHAMFIN seeks to promote the growth and development of the 
microfinance industry in Ghana and present a common platform for the Rural & Community Banks, 
Saving & Loans Companies, Credit Unions, Financial NGOs, Microfinance Companies and 
Microinsurance companies and Susu Collectors. Like the OFISD, I contacted GHAMFIN because they 
are also heavily involved in the microfinance sector of Ghana. I had in the previous day contacted the 
Secretariat by phone through a number I eventually found on the internet after long hours of google 
search. They had moved from their former office at Achimota-Accra, so not only was their postal address 
defunct, also their fixed line phones (popularly called landlines in Ghana) too were not in use.  
 
At the GHAMFIN, I interviewed Mr. Emmanuel Asante, the Finance & Accounts Officer. Before 
coming to GHAMFIN, he was a manager of an MFI in Kumasi and has been working in the sector for 
more than 3 years, so he was very familiar with the problem I was examining. I bought some of their 
published reports, which contained helpful information but were not available anywhere online. Based 
on the information gathered from my conversation with the Bank of Ghana and the GHAMFIN 
personnel, I adjusted the interview guide that I had prepared for the employees of the collapsed MFIs. 
 
The new research design  
Before meeting the Bank of Ghana and the GHAMFIN personnel, I had contacted people across Ghana 
to link me to former employees of collapsed MFIs, but with no success. However, after learning from 
the Bank of Ghana that it is in the Ashanti Region that MFIs collapse most, because of time constraints, 
I chose to focus on the Ashanti Region in selecting cases of both collapsed and functioning MFIs. In 
                                                        
33 For instance, it emerged in the course of the interviews with the former employees of the defunct MFIs that the BoG 
has introduced a biometric software, which helps to track and verify the borrowing history of clients to prevent 
“double-dip” – clients interborrowing from MFIs. But the Bank of Ghana said that the software though helpful, did not 
come from them. 
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view of the usual bureaucratic inertias and chain of procedures involved in accessing information from 
institutions, I anticipated having more problems with the Bank of Ghana and the GHAMFIN. And in 
respect of the former employees of the collapsed MFIs, I was certain that it was going to be difficult to 
access them. However, as it turned out, they became the only respondents I had for the study after the 
botched attempts to access the functioning MFIs. The new design focused on only collapsed MFIs 
located in the Ashanti Region. The Ashanti Region is part of the Northern sector 34 and is centrally 
located in the middle belt of Ghana, with Kumasi as its regional capital.35 The Kumasi metropolis alone 
accounts for nearly one-third of the region’s population.   
 
Selection of collapsed MFIs 
Identifying the collapsed MFIs was as difficult as getting the former employees themselves for the 
interviews. If there were official list of collapsed MFIs in Ghana, this task would have been easier. It 
was part of my request to the Bank of Ghana and the officer assigned to me agreed to email it with the 
response to the interview questions. However, the mail I received did not contain that information so I 
called him to find out. He explained that when the MFIs collapse, they do not take the legal steps to file 
for bankruptcy with the Bank, so there was not any such list. This placed limitation on knowing the 
exact number and names of collapsed MFIs in the Region. For example, all but one of the institutions 
studied in this work collapsed in 2014 but there is only one reported case in the media of a collapsed 
MFI in 201436 and that MFI is not part of those studied herein. This means that many MFIs just like the 
ones studied in this work, have collapsed unreported. Even when they are reported, except the case of 
Lord Winners Microfinance Company and Westbanc Capital Group37, the names of the specific MFIs 
involved are not mentioned. For instance, none of the several media reports on the fifty MFIs that 
collapsed in 2013 mentioned the names of the specific MFIs involved.  
 
As a result, I had to rely on the public to identify the collapsed MFIs. I gathered from the public, the 
names of seven collapsed MFIs all located in the Ashanti Region, Kumasi and started tracing the former 
employees for interviews. Out of this, four (4) former employees of four different collapsed MFIs 
                                                        
34 Ghana’s microfinance sector is divided administratively into Southern and Northern Sectors. TheAshanti, Brong-
Ahafo, Northern, Upper East, Upper West and Northern Regions constitute the Northern Sector whilst the Greater Accra, 
Eastern, Volta, Central and Western Regions constitute the Southern sector 
35 Most of the region's inhabitants are Asantes, one of Ghana's major ethnic groups. Most of Ghana's cocoa is grown in 
the Ashanti, and it is also a major site of Ghana's gold-mining industry35. The region is the most populous, housing 
4,780,380 (19.4%) of the total population of Ghana (Ghana Statistical Services, 2012).  
36 Ghanaweb –  29 January 2014: Lord Winners Microfinance swindles over 5,000 customers 
http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=299140 
37 Google Search of collapsed MFIs in Ghana returns the names of only Lord Winners Microfinance Company and 
Westbanc Capital Group. The other reports are general and do not mention the specific names of the MFIs 
involved.http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=299140  
http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=291198  
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(profiled below) agreed to be interviewed. This means that the study did not cover all collapsed 
institutions in the Ashanti Region – indeed, the total number of collapsed MFIs in the Region is 
unknown. The four collapsed MFIs were the only ones selected and studied because they were the only 
ones I could access. They are Double Up Microfinance Company Ltd, Work Up Microfinance Company 
Ltd, Grow Rich Microfinance Company Ltd and Dream Well Microfinance Company Ltd. 
 
Double Up Microfinance Company Limited began operation in 2009 with four customers and four 
staff. The company grew phenomenally in a spate of 5 years. Before folding up in 2014, it had 15 
branches, all located in the Ashanti and Brong Ahafo Regions. Double Up crisis started in October\ 
November 2013. The representative of Double Up interviewed for the study was a young HND in 
Accountancy holder from Sunyani Polytechnic who entered microfinance in 2011 around 
October/November until 2014 when Double Up collapsed. He is now into hire purchase. The 
interviewee started working with Double Up as Operations Manager, later as Credit Officer. He was 
then promoted to a Branch Manager and later as Head of Operations and Internal Auditor. 
 
Work Up Microfinance Company Limited also started operation in 2011 with four branches at Agona, 
Wiamoase, Mankranso and Fade. In a matter of 4 years (2011-2014), the company grew from four to 
twenty-six branches. The products of Work Up included Current Account, Savings Account, Susu 
Accounts (Anidaso Susu and Normal Susu) and Investment Accounts (Work Up Trust and Work Up 
Gold)38. It was a sole proprietorship company with limited liabilities. The interviewee from Work Up as 
at the time the institution collapsed was a Branch Manager. He started as a Marketing Officer in 2012, 
and later became a Marketing Manager at the Branch and Loans Recovery Manager and promoted to an 
Accountant and later Operations Manager before becoming a Branch Manager.  
 
Grow Rich Microfinance Company Limited was incorporated as a private limited liability company 
on July 21, 2010 under the Ghana Companies Code, 1963 (Act 179). Full operations started on 13th 
September, 2010 at Obuasi, the head office with four (4) staff – the Manager, Operations Manager and 
two Client Relationship Officers. Grow Rich collapsed in the year 2013. As at that time, the company 
had three (3) branches. The interviewee for this study was working with the institution as a marketer. In 
their credit operations, Grow Rich focused on lending to very small and medium-sized enterprises with 
the conviction that these businesses create the largest number of jobs and make vital contributions to the 
economies in which they operate. The interviewee from Grow Rich is currently working with a Susu 
and loans company and he interlaced his submissions with his new experiences – comparing his new 
place to his former institution in explaining why it collapsed. However, he asked that his current 
institution’s name not be disclosed because he did not have his superiors’ permission to divulge 
                                                        
38 They are pseudonyms. The real names reveal the identity of the MFI. 
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information about the institution. 
 
Dream Well Microfinance Company Limited – The Company was licensed by the Bank of Ghana 
and started to operate on 2nd January, 2013 with 19 staff and one branch at Atonsu with a capital of 
hundred and twenty thousand Ghana Cedis (GH 120, 000.00). The shareholders were the CEO and his 
wife. The man had 80% and the wife 20% shares. Dream Well collapsed barely a year in business. 
Within 8 months of operation, the company established four branches. The respondent from Dream Well 
interviewed for this study was the Human Resource Manager who doubled as the Operations Manager. 
He holds a Bachelor of Arts degree in Publishing Studies. 
 
Interviews with the former employees of the collapsed MFIS  
The use of interviews was appropriate to the study for its nature demanded it to be situated within the 
practical experiences of the stakeholders. As noted by Kvale et al, interview helps researchers to elicit 
“continually new insights into the subjects lived world” (Kvale et al, 2009:123). Thus, interviews help 
to gather rich, deep and original data on the subject under investigation. During interviewing, the 
interviewer could probe responses and this help to elicit further information.  
 
The interviews were one-to-one. Although I had a guide to help me focus on the relevant questions, the 
exchange was conversational. The interviews started with introductory comments about the research, 
although this had already been explained on the interview guides which prior to the interviews had been 
emailed39 to the interviewees. I thanked them for agreeing to talk to me and assured to keep their 
identities confidential when they requested that. Except the representative of the GHAMFIN, all the 
other interviewees requested that their names and that of their institutions not be disclosed. The names 
given to the collapsed MFIs are therefore pseudonyms.  
 
Although I had conducted interviews before as part of some practical exercises in one of my 
methodological workshops and during semester projects, all those interviews were conducted in groups. 
This was my first experience in conducting an interview alone. As observed by Kvale & Brinkmann 
(2009), “active listening is as important as the specific mastery of questioning techniques. The 
interviewer needs to learn to listen to what is said and how it is said (p. 138). Given my novelty of 
conducting an interview alone, the uncomfortable enterprise of simultaneously asking questions, 
listening to responses, taking notes and concentrating on the whole process without losing focus was 
certainly going to be difficult for me. To avoid distractions, I sought permission from the interviewees 
                                                        
39  The representative of the GHAMFIN did not receive the interview guide prior to the interview. He agreed to talk to 
the researcher the very day he was submitting the permission letter to the institution.  
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to tape record the sessions so I could transcribe them later for the analysis to which they agreed. 
 
The interview sessions started with straightforward questions like asking the interviewees to give a brief 
introduction about themselves and little information about their former institutions before delving into 
crunchy issues. Morse & Field have long ago noted that “data collection can be an intense experience, 
especially if the topic that one has chosen has to do with the illness experience or other stressful human 
experiences” (Dickson-Swift, et al, 2007: 327). Certainly, sharing information on an unsuccessful 
enterprise in which one was a major player was not going to be psychologically easy for the former 
employees of the collapsed MFIs. This was going to be further worsened by my need to probe their 
responses with critically incisive questions. In view of the above, questions which sounded personal and 
could press the interviewees to feel as though they were being tried for perhaps their mistakes that 
contributed to the collapse of their institutions were framed in a general way.  
 
The tape-recorded interviews were later transcribed with the aid of Express Scribe Transcription 
Software. It must however be said that the transcription did not fully cover the whole interview durations 
– only relevant parts were initially transcribed. However, in the course of analysis, I went back to re-
transcribe some parts to support some arguments. Some of the interviewees mixed the local (Twi) 
language with English so the interviews flowed smoothly. The necessary translations to English were 
done during transcription.  
 
Of course, this comes with a downside in for instance, finding English words that exactly translate into 
the local words used by the interviewees. However, I would venture to say that many years of my use 
of the local and English languages for even formal studies ought to invest in me sufficient competence 
for the task of, if not finding the exact words, their closest in meaning. The transcripts of the interviews 
and the written response of the Bank of Ghana constituted the main primary data for the study. When 
quoted in the analysis or anywhere as GHAMFIN, (2015), BoG, (2015), Dream Well, (2015), Grow 
Rich, (2015), Work Up, (2015) and Double Up, (2015), the referred page numbers are those found in 
the attached appendices.   
 
Field problems and limitations of the study  
Aside the challenges faced in accessing the respondents, there were other practical challenges and 
limitations of this study that are worth acknowledging. First, there was a severe energy crisis in Ghana 
and therefore access to electricity to charge my laptop and other gadgets for the interviews was very 
difficult. This delayed not only data collection but also timely transcription of the interviews and writing 
of the work in general. Second, after few days in Ghana, my laptop packed up and the local technicians 
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could not fix it. I had to borrow that of a friend and sometimes, improvise my phone to continue with 
the writing.  
 
Third, the study was such that it was difficult to communicate its object to especially the former 
employees of the collapsed MFIs. It is naturally uneasy to be seated and ‘drilled’ (so to speak) on how 
an enterprise you were part of demised. I had to communicate the study to them in a more polite manner. 
However, this task worsened in the course of the interviews when critically incisive and seemingly, 
personal questions had to be asked. I therefore felt smooth– talking them to be part of the study. The 
task of balancing my quest for knowledge with my ethical need to be open, transparent and honest with 
the interviewees was very uneasy.   
 
Fourth, there is the Ghana Association of Microfinance Companies (GAMC), which deals directly with 
microfinance companies but they were not included in this study. Had they been included, I have no 
doubt that the information from them could have added more depth to the study. The challenge of not 
being able to contact the GAMC was not only because they did not have contact addresses on their 
website, but also all the telephone numbers taken from different sources to reach them were inactive. 
None of the several mails and inquiry forms filled and sent to them got a response and leads to the 
location of their office all proved inaccurate. However, substantial amount of their study reports 
premised on empirical studies that I was able to access were incorporated in the study. Thus, that 
information may be just as good as primary empirical information.  
  
Finally, another challenge to this study is what constitutes a collapsed or bankrupt MFI. Whilst the news 
about collapsed MFIs is public knowledge, there was no official document on them for reasons already 
explained elsewhere. Therefore, the term collapsed or bankrupt MFI is used in this study to loosely 
imply that the MFI is not operating anymore.    
 
Generalization of findings  
First, the claim that it is not possible to generalize from case studies has long been challenged. Statistical 
count of opinions or research participants, the so-called representative sample, is not the only valid route 
to generalization (Gluckman, 1961; Mitchell, 1987; Flyvberg, 2006). The four collapsed MFIs studied 
were all located in Kumasi in the Ashanti Region. As noted elsewhere, all the stakeholders contacted for 
this study independently confirmed that the collapse of MFIs is more prevalent in that Region than any 
other part of Ghana. It also emerged from the conversations held with the Bank of Ghana personnel that 
MFIs that collapse in other regions usually have their headquarters (mother branches) in the Ashanti 
Region.  
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So the case of the Ashanti Region could be classified as extreme. An extreme case is an observation that 
lies far away from the mean of a given distribution. That is to say, it is unusual, atypical (Seawright & 
Gerring, 2008). The expectation as pertained to extreme cases was that the findings from the Region 
would be different from the general observation. However, the contrary was found to be true. As stated 
by the interviewee from Dream Well Microfinance Limited, “the very factors that account for the 
collapse of MFIs in the Ashanti Region are similar to those that account for the collapse of all MFIs in 
Ghana” (Dream Well, 2015:1). This view was collaborated by the information gathered from the Bank 
of Ghana. The factors noted by the Bank as the causes of MFIs collapse in Ghana were virtually the 
same as those shared by the former employees of the collapsed MFIs as to what accounted for the 
collapse of their institutions. Second, since most collapsed MFIs in other Regions of Ghana mostly have 
their headquarter offices in the Ashanti Region, information on collapsed institutions in the Region could 
offer a useful perspective for understanding why MFIs collapse in other parts of the country. Third, the 
findings made in this study collaborate that of similar studies done on MFIs collapse in Ghana. Fourth, 
most of the factors that caused the collapse of the MFIs studied are in sync with those noted in the 
literature as accounting for the problem in other parts of the world.   
 
So where do the findings of this study fit in the broad scheme of drivers of commercial MFIs into 
bankruptcy in Ghana? In respect of case studies, the basis of generalization is not rooted in the 
representativeness of the number of cases studied but in the causal linkages between the findings and 
the general situation. Clyde Mitchell puts it this way: “The inference from case studies is only logical 
or causal and cannot be statistical and that extrapolability from any one case study to like situations in 
general is based on only logical inference. We infer that the features present in the case study will be 
related in a wider population not because the [number of cases] is representative but because our analysis 
is unassailable” (Mitchell, 1987: 200). The consistency of the findings of the study with the general 
causal factors of the collapse of MFIs in other parts of Ghana noted in the Bank of Ghana and other 
scholarly studies allows this study to be generalized in terms of providing an explanatory reference or 
benchmark for examining what drives commercial MFIs into bankruptcy in Ghana. 
 
Personal reflections   
Five months of intensive work, worsened by fieldwork challenges has invested in me some lessons for 
doing research, which undoubtedly would be useful to my future endeavours. The access challenges I 
faced on the field has thought me to prepare in advance when I am to conduct any empirical studies. In 
this respect, I am going to make sure I do not lose the contacts or break the networks I have established 
in conducting this study – they could become invaluable assets for similar, related, or even entirely 
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different studies in the future. If I had them prior to the study, surely, things might have been different. 
I also have learnt to pay attention to even entirely unrelated events when collecting data. As I was 
writing, reliving field events became useful to putting even already penned down notes in context and 
perspective. I was told this in one of my methodological seminars, but the realness of it dawned on me 
in the course of this study.  
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CHAPTER 4: COLLAPSE OF MFIs IN GHANA: WHAT FACTORS ARE AT WORK? 
 
This chapter analyses the data gathered on the drivers of MFIs into bankruptcy in Ghana. The factors 
that caused the demise of the four collapsed MFIs selected for this study were similar. Therefore, instead 
of a case-by-case analysis, I do a composite analysis of the four cases. However, strikingly dissimilar 
factors and events are highlighted. The factors are grouped into internal and external factors and the 
monitoring challenges of the Bank of Ghana. The internal or firm/institution related factors relate to the 
operation strategies and managerial problems of the MFIs that contributed to their collapse. They 
include indiscriminate branching, offering of unsustainable returns/products to customers, failure to do 
due diligence, mismanagement and violation of the Bank of Ghana’s rules regarding their operations. 
The external factors relate to things, which the MFIs have no control over and include macroeconomic 
instability and ‘collapse rumours’ which lead to panic withdrawal. The last causal factor was the 
oversight and monitoring challenges of the Bank of Ghana to identify in advance and nip illegal 
operations and unethical practices in the bud.   
 
The analysis was done by reflecting on the primary data in the light of the conceptual framework. In 
this way, whilst contextualizing the Ghanaian case, we are still able to understand it in reference to the 
larger discourse on why contrary to the Institutionalists claim, commercial MFIs could become self-
unstainable. The chapter is divided into four sections: The first section analyses the internal factors and 
the second section, the external factors. The third section analyses how the Bank of Ghana’s monitoring 
challenges contributed to the collapse. Afterwards, all the factors are summarized into a conceptual 
framework of drivers of commercial MFIs into bankruptcy in Ghana. The last section focused on the 
critical issues of what happens to customers’ funds after the collapse of their MFIs and the pervasiveness 
of MFIs collapse in the Ashanti Region – the setting of the study.  
 
Section 1: Internal factors  
As discussed throughout the work, the whole project of commercializing microfinance was founded on 
the neoliberal-belief that it will bring into the sector, more players who will need to compete for profit 
and clients, and will therefore have to inter alia adopt optimal practices to reduce cost and risk, innovate 
and diversify products. However, the competition and profitability that the neoliberals had envisaged to 
become the driving forces of the new wave microfinance model’s efficiency rather became its Achilles 
heel. As we learned from the NIE theorists, exigencies of competition, fuelled by the quest for profit 
could persuade actors to undertake suboptimal practices. At this juncture, we analyse the suboptimal 
practices and managerial problems of the MFIs that contributed to their collapse, which are together 
categorized as internal or institution related factors. We would in seriatim analyse them under these 
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headings: Indiscriminate branching, offering of unsustainable returns/products to customers, failure to 
do due diligence, mismanagement and violation of the Bank of Ghana’s rules and guidelines. 
 
Internal factor 1: Indiscriminate branching  
Microfinance supporters justify the flogging of high interest rates by MFIs on grounds that they are 
more prone to risk – they do not only have high operational cost, they also deal with the part of the 
population known to be highly risky. Thus, clients with low level of education; involved in enterprises 
that are risky; live in areas that are known to have poor sanitation and therefore have high incidence of 
diseases; have no or little access to health care facilities and do not have reliable income (Rhyne, 2010; 
Rosenberg, Gonzalez & Narain, 2009). The problem however is that in spite of the already risky profile 
and high cost of operation associated with microfinance, most MFIs rather pursue activities (mostly 
linked to the quest to compete – recall conceptual framework) which further increase cost instead of 
keeping it under control.  
 
The most common of such practices in Ghana is branching. As noted by Ayeh (2015), some MFIs have 
adopted physical branch establishment to expand outreach and increase their share of the market. 
However, “unknown to them, opening branches mean[s] more expenses on utility, salaries and other 
overhead expenses” (Owusu-Nuamah, 2014). They wrongly perceive “visibility as viability” (BoG, 
2015: 3). The primary data gathered from the field collaborated the view that the phenomenon of 
branching is common among MFIs in Ghana. Except Grow Rich, which maintained three branches for 
three years (2010 – 2013), the branch expansion of the other collapsed MFIs was stratospheric. Within 
a short period of five years (2009 – 2014), Double Up opened 15 branches, whilst Work Up grew from 
four (4) branches to twenty-six branches in a matter of 4 years (2011-2014). Dream Well survived for 
only eight months but managed to open four branches.  
 
The interviewees confirmed that unbridled branching crucially contributed to the collapse of their 
former institutions. Of course, once MFIs are in competition with one another, proximity to customers 
and visibility could be a competitive step to increasing outreach and market share. However, 
unrestrained branching could have a toll on the company. First, opening additional branches means 
additional cost and here not only in terms of among other things new office furnishes and staff, but also 
additional paid-up capital40. Second, as noted by the interviewee from the GHAMFIN, it takes time for 
an MFI to become financially viable so new branches certainly will experience loses – having too many 
new branches will therefore translate into incurring even more additional cost and this was true of the 
                                                        
40 The 2013 revised-Bank of Ghana rules say that MFIs with 1 – 5 branches shall attract an additional paid-up capital of 
GH200, 000 for each branch 
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collapsed MFIs studied.  
 
For instance, in the case of Dream Well, while their Atonsu head office was making expenditure around 
seven thousand six hundred Ghana Cedis (GH7, 600) a month, the income was only two to three 
thousand and the situation was the same in the other branches. They were making expenditures around 
GH 5000 and income around GH 1500 and GH 2000 (Dream Well, 2015). In this respect, contrary to 
opinion, opening new branches would not lead to geographical diversification of portfolios and 
widening of deposits’, which reduce financial institutions vulnerability to economic shocks (Gart 1994; 
Hubbard 1994; Cherin & Melcher, 1988). It rather adds greatly to operational losses since you do not 
make profit immediately. As observed by Ayeh (2015), the new capital investments in branching will 
not only add to the cost profile but will also compete with available funds for on-lending purposes. And 
given that loans and advances are the main sources of income for MFIs, growing more loses or not 
having the needed funds to grow quality loans will mean that the company cannot generate enough 
income to support its operations.  
 
How Dream well collapsed aptly reflects this: “Our main income was the interest we charged on loans. 
It got to a time, we had no money to give out as loans because we had invested them in creating 
branches” (Dream Well, 2015: 2). The problem here therefore is not about rising level of competition 
causing an increase in failures because lower profits are encouraging the MFIs to take on more risk. 
Rather, it is about rising level of competition for profit leading to suboptimal practices, upholding the 
NIE theory argument that embodiment of profitability in competition could lead actors to undertake 
suboptimal practices (see North, 1990).  
 
Internal factor 2: Unsustainable returns to customers  
One of the key challenges noted by the Bank of Ghana as facing microfinance in Ghana is the offering 
of unsustainable returns to customers by MFIs in order to attract and retain them (BoG, 2015). This 
problem relates directly to the increased number of players in the sector sequel to the financial 
liberalization and commercialization of microfinance in Ghana (Serrano & Sackey, 2015; Gallardo, 
2002). Today, providers of microfinance services in Ghana are not just the traditionally established 
MFIs, there are also financial NGOs which have transformed into regulated institutions mobilizing 
savings (Atiase, 2008) as well as commercial banks that have downscaled their operations to incorporate 
microfinance services (Yeboah, 2010). The GHAMFIN pegs the number of MFIs, individual 
moneylenders and Susu collectors at over 1,420 and 722 respectively41. In view of the paucity of 
                                                        
41 Ghana Broadcasting Corporation: Audio recording of a speech delivered by the Council Chairman of the Ghana 
Microfinance institutions, Network, GHAMFIN, Emmanuel Darko during the 6th annual general meeting of GHAMFIN 
in Accra on November 14th, 2014.  http://gbcghana.com/1.1896605 
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information on MFIs, their operations and their clients in Ghana as noted by Serrano & Sackey, (2015), 
it could be irresistibly argued that the number of MFIs (including unlicensed ones) in operation are more 
than what is on record. The import of this is that there are several MFIs competing for the services of 
the ‘’poor’’ in Ghana. It is trite learning in economics that once many players are in competition for a 
given market share, they are bound to work at outpacing one another. And here, the eagerness to attract 
more customers and carve lion shares of an already saturated market on the part of each MFI tended 
them to collectively roll-out packages and products that will endear more clients to them. But the 
downside was that most of the products were unsustainable. As noted by Owusu-Nuamah (2014), some 
of these products were too costly to the companies; their income streams could not cover some of the 
expenses they were incurring in the form of interest paid to clients.   
 
Whilst some MFIs were paying 30 to 35% interests on deposits (far in excess of the 24% interest even 
the Bank of Ghana gives on treasury bills), others were tripling three months-deposits as loans for 
customers. Some MFIs were also charging zero fees on deposits, while others shared cloths and cement 
to customers for opening accounts with them. All the interviewees from the collapsed MFIs 
independently confirmed that their institutions did one or more of those things to win customers, 
confirming yet again, the NIE theorists’ argument that competitive quest for profit could lead actors in 
the same market to undertake suboptimal practices (North, 1990).  
 
The challenge they subsequently came to face was sustainability. The question is what the GHAMFIN 
interviewee asked, as to the “kind of investments”, the MFIs could do and get big enough returns to to 
pay the customers and still have something to run their institutions. The only investments known to 
them42 were treasury bills, real estate and buying fixed assets like lands, cars and of course, creating 
branches and since these kinds of investments were illiquid, they could not fall on them when they 
became pressed. Secondly, the returns they received on their investments were not high enough for them 
to be able to sustain the huge interests they were paying to customers. As the Work Up interviewee 
admitted, “in the long run it became a virus because you will pay more interest” (Work Up, 2015: 2).  
 
The MFIs inability to continually triple deposits as loans as well as pay the huge interests promised on 
deposits infuriated most customers, who in turn in their numbers closed their accounts with them. This 
together with other factors accounted for the collapse of Work Up and Dream Well. However, as noted 
by Dupont (2005), financial institutions misfortunes could be contagious. The repercussions of offering 
unsustainable packages do not run down only the vogue MFIs offering them but could even transcend 
                                                        
42 Some of them did not even invest the money; they were lying idle. For instance the interviewee from Dream Well said 
that they just sent their money to their mother bank, Fidelity Bank without investing it and were surviving on only interest 
on loans and some other minor charges on book purchases like new passbooks and also minimum balances.  
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to others who may be giving reasonable interests. The point here is that the different customers of the 
competing MFIs compare and share their experiences with one another – they are friends, family 
members, they operate similar businesses, so this is expected. Some customers upon hearing the 
gargantuan interests and mouth-watering packages their friends were receiving felt short-changed, and 
therefore beseeched their MFIs for similar packages with threats of moving their accounts from them. 
Double Up suffered this fate: “You will see a MFI operating at high interest rates just to attract customers 
while charging low interest on loans. In our case, our customers were complaining that other MFIs were 
giving high interest so they moved their accounts from us to them the moment they heard, if I go there 
I will get better packages. This really affected us” (Double Up, 2015: 3).  
 
However, those MFIs whose customer base phenomenally increased because of this could also not 
sustain the packages, so all the MFIs together lost the trust of the customers who were already battered 
by economic hardships. This led to deposit losses and increment in withdrawals.  
 
Internal factor 3: Failure to do due diligence  
Originally, one risk-averting measure the creditors used was to give loans in groups. Here the possibility 
of the entire group defaulting or running away with the loan was quite low so risk level was significantly 
reduced (Hubka & Zaidi, 2005). However, today, group lending is increasingly tailing off; the order of 
the day is individual lending. Since microcredit is generally about collateral free loans, the onus lies on 
the MFIs to scrutinize diligently the debt capacity and credibility of loan applicants. Cases of microcredit 
clients inter-borrowing or becoming over indebted to MFIs have been widely reported in Nicaragua, 
India, Bangladesh and other parts of the world.  
 
The issue is as rightly noted by Robinson, commercialization has brought an increased “competition for 
the business of low-income clients” (Robinson, 2001: 29) evidenced by the slew of MFIs established 
worldwide. This has make abundant availability of ‘cheap’ credit to clients. Increased competition 
among MFIs and clients’ unbridled access to a multitude of microfinance providers as noted by 
Andersen (2009), remove the deterrence of strategic default that a monopolistic MFI enjoys, portfolio 
qualities then decline subsequently. Thus, insisting on due diligence which generally is a bit time 
consuming then becomes disadvantageous to ethical MFIs for clients disturbed or delayed by due 
diligent procedures could easily access loans from competitors without or with little hassle. Borrowers 
could thus resort to “double-dip” and consequently become inter-indebted (over-indebted) to almost all 
operating MFIs by borrowing from one MFI to settle loans contracted from the other and vice versa. 
  
This phenomenon treaded through the interviews with the former employees of the collapsed MFIs 
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confirming an earlier finding of Grammling, (2009) and Kappel et al., (2010) studies that over-
indebtedness and “double dip” is common among microfinance clients in Ghana. This is what the 
customers do as aptly described by the interviewee from Double Up: 
 
 What happened is, ours, as we say, you will deposit and we will base on 
your deposit give a loan. Since the customer wants the loan, he would be 
working with a different MFI, and will be doing small small Susu 
[deposits] there, get about five hundred over there, take a loan of thousand 
from there, come and deposit that thousand with you, get about three 
thousand loan from you, go and deposit it in a different bank and take 
about ten thousand loan from them (Double Up, 2015: 7).  
 
As noted elsewhere, similar practices in Nicaragua led a kite-maker in Jalapa to accumulate a record 
debt of $600,000 to 19 MFIs. How this is able to happen is not magical. The competing MFIs have no 
means of verifying the debt profiles of prospective clients from competitors and do not control the loan 
disbursements of their competitors. Therefore, the clients are able to play them against one another as 
noted in Andersen (2009).  
 
Most MFIs in Ghana lost significant shares of their operating capital through this. While the problem 
reflects customers playing the competing MFIs against one another, materially, the root cause is the 
MFIs own methods of recruiting clients. In Ghana, the popular method of recruiting clients is this: The 
MFIs ask clients to contribute for a month or two for them to double or triple their balances for them as 
loans. This downplays the significance of proper assessment and monitoring of loans. Loan Officer to 
client ratio surely would widen for the package as it did was certainly going to endear more customers 
to the MFIs. The MFIs therefore could not have enough time to look at loans that were defaulting 
because of the huge number of clients involved and also because they were always busily serving 
incoming clients until the loans hit the expiry region – by then it becomes extremely difficult to recover. 
The clients identified this loophole and played the companies by robbing Peter to pay Paul as noted by 
Owusu-Nuamah, (2014). 
 
The enormity of this problem to the MFIs led to the introduction of a biometric software, which reveals 
the debt history when the fingerprints of potential loan applicants are taken. However, by the time the 
software came, most MFIs including the ones studied had already collapsed. In some cases, the MFIs 
took collaterals but the challenge was that when clients default, it takes too long to legally dispose the 
property. In addition, some clients used properties already collateralized elsewhere to take loans from 
other MFIs. The players have therefore come out with collateral registration software which allows them 
to verify whether or not the property being brought by a loan applicant as collateral has not been used 
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for the same purpose with another MFI or for similar transactions elsewhere. 
  
Internal factor 4: Mismanagement  
The commercialization of microfinance came along with competition for both funding and clients. To 
successfully operate a MFI, inter alia, effective management of cost structures to ensure sufficient 
returns to pay for the more expensive commercial funds is a prerequisite. MFIs operators must 
effectively manage risks and do cost control before they could achieve institutional financial viability 
and self-sustainability (Andersen, 2009). The rapidly expanding loan portfolios and increased scope of 
operation of MFIs also substantially increase the risks in providing microfinance services. This requires 
MFIs operators to be cautious and undertake economically sound ventures.  
 
However, among microfinance practitioners, reckless expenditure, poor risk management and 
mitigation have been widely noted (CSFI, 2008; 2009; 2010; 2012; 2014). The 2008 Microfinance 
Banana Skins publication noted that “the greatest risk facing” MFIs is the quality of management (CSFI, 
2008: 15). The literature on the operations of MFIs have noted bad managerial practices as one of the 
major causes of the failures of MFIs (Sinclair, 2012; Bateman, 2011; 2010) and this was one the 
profound factors that accounted for the collapse of the MFIs studied herein.     
 
For instance, Grow Rich was disbursing loans to customers about whom they had measly information 
and there was no requirement for a guarantor. So a significant number of their customers bolted away 
with their money, some also used loans from them to pay other loans contracted from their competitors. 
The case of Work Up was terribly bad. Astonishingly, the company was virtually dishing out money to 
any person who cared to apply for loan. The interviewee from the institution thus submitted: “When you 
come to us, we were having money, so we were not thinking about may be your guarantor, knowing 
your capacity that you can pay” (Work Up, 2015: 1). To my dismay, he added that they had a “Credit 
Committee” superintending over this practice! How do you give money out without thinking of the 
person’s capacity to repay? Clearly, as noted in the industry’s 2012 report, “the flood of money pouring 
into the microfinance sector is stirring up irrational exuberance and undermining discipline” (CSFI, 
2012: 28).  
 
Other profoundly bad managerial practices, which emerged in the interviews, are poor risk management 
and reckless expenditure, so by the time operationally relevant software like the one for clients’ debt 
history verification came, they (Dream Well and Double Up) were broke and could not procure them. 
Instead of investing in current assets, they rather focused on fixed assets – buying and furnishing big 
buildings for offices, buying cars, and other landed properties, forgetting that the monies necessarily 
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were not theirs but people’s deposits. A study conducted by the Ghana Association of Microfinance 
Companies (GAMC) found that most MFIs operators fail to apply financial intermediation principles. 
The study noted: “Some [MFIs] will take money from the public and instead of lending it, they thought 
it was risky and so invested in other ventures without taking into consideration maturity, and so in some 
cases you see [firms] borrowing short term and then investing long term in other projects that had 
gestations that were long term”43.  
  
The other factors relate to blatantly poor strategies to recruit clients. One of the interviewees submitted: 
“if we come to market ourselves to you and you say, oh go and come tomorrow when you come 
tomorrow I will pay, we will make sure that we come tomorrow. We were not thinking about how costly 
you are to us. We were thinking we like your money, your GH2 Cedis. If we spend GH10 Cedis today 
on you, tomorrow we will get more than that” (Work Up, 2015: 1). As if fortiori, spending huge 
resources to recruit clients’ flourishes their businesses so they could pay off the investments sank into 
recruiting them.   
 
Moreover, ridiculously, the MFIs owners’ were nonchalant to clearly imminent risks. As submitted by 
the interviewee from Work Up: “And also, I do not know, I do not want to say it is mismanagement. It’s 
like at the top management, sometimes you being on the ground you will see something and you would 
recommend something and they would say nothing will happen. But you are on the ground. You will 
just report to them but they will sit there and watch it.” (Work Up, 2015: 2). I inquired further: “Is it not 
incredible that someone would put money in such a big business, those on the field will raise issues and 
report to them and they will disregard it, what was the motivation?” His response: “what they were very 
much interested [in] was the deposits –the money [that was] coming in. They were so bold enough [to 
say] that nothing will happen. They are too big to fail.” This yet again gives credence to the NIE 
theorists’ postulation that when incentives are embodied in profitability, actors could be led towards 
inefficient practices and outcomes (North, 1990). The finding also collaborates that of Owusu-Nuamah 
who noted that one reason for the collapse of MFIs in Ghana is that the owners do not heed to technical 
warnings and advice from professionals. He stated, “these business [MFIs] owners would not listen to 
the advice from young finance professionals they had employed. The young professionals also had no 
option but to allow owners to have their way in order to keep their jobs” (Owusu-Nuamah, 2014). 
 
Dream Well Microfinance Company deserves a special mention here for it has all the trappings of a 
badly managed company. Bemoaning on why they collapsed, the former Human Resource and 
Operations Manager who himself holds a degree in Publishing Studies stated that from the top hierarchy 
to the last man at the bottom of management, none of them had well-grounded experience in banking 
                                                        
43 Ghana: Storm in Ghana’s microfinance industry not over - http://microfinanceafrica.net/news/ghana-storm-in-
ghanas-microfinance-industry-not-over/  
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nor microfinance. They were only receiving summary lectures from some consultants “once a while”. 
He thus submitted:  
 
In our case, you can’t find anyone who has worked with microfinance for 
long, say 3 or 4 years nor any experienced banker manning the institution. 
We were meeting these people once a while and they gave us summary 
lectures for two or three hours on how to operate an MFI. We only had 2 
or 3 weeks training which in my view was not enough. We had educated 
workers with HND as minimum qualification but we all had no stint with 
banking nor microfinance before coming to Dream Well (Dream Well, 
2015: 2). 
 
No wonder they could uncover the fraudulent deals some workers perpetrated against the company only 
after collapsing. Related to this is what the interviewee from Double Up said that in their case, they 
found a lot of endorsed withdrawals and loans authorized by some of their managers who would not 
have endorsed them, had they the needed technical competence. As it turned out, Double Up recruitment 
was not merit based but on familial relations, giving credence to the Bank of Ghana’s claim that most 
MFIs do not employ qualified personnel to manage their operations (BoG, 2015).   
  
In the case of Dream Well, this problem greatly manifested in how they operated. For instance, whilst 
the company was giving 10% returns for 3 months on deposits, it was charging 9% interests on the loans 
they disbursed. The company established a branch at a cost of hundred and twenty thousand Ghana 
Cedis (GH 120, 000), which was equivalent to their seed capital. Most of their actions were highly 
questionable. That, the company could collapse just eight months of commencing business is enough 
testament to show how badly it was managed. Beside Owusu-Nuamah (2014), other studies on MFIs 
operations by Addo (2014) and Asiama, & Osei (2007) found mismanagement as one of the reasons for 
the collapse of MFIs in Ghana.   
 
Mostly, MFIs unlike established banks, the argument goes, are not manned by eminently qualified staff 
(CSFI, 2008; 2009; 2012). The observation is that this problem is however acute in Africa and Sub 
Saharan Africa in particular, (CGAP 2009; MIX, 2009) but also in other parts of the world – where well-
educated staff at middle management level is difficult to come by and vulnerable to poaching from 
commercial banks (CSFI, 2009). As stated by one investment officer with the IFC in South Africa, there 
are “not enough good managers in [the microfinance] market” (CSFI, 2008: 15). The case of Ghana is 
not different. The Bank of Ghana has consistently complained about the competence of managers of 
MFIs in Ghana44. It is however profoundly ironic that after all the huge financial resources trickling into 
                                                        
44  Dr Yaw Gyima-Larbi, head of microfinance at the Bank of Ghana stated the pervasiveness of “liquidity crisesis in 
Ghana is as a result of among other factors  “incompetent staff” managing MFIs:  
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microfinance, the sector would keep complaining of difficulties in attracting and retaining talents (see 
CSFI, 2008; 2009; 2012) 
 
Internal factor 5: Violation of Bank of Ghana rules and guidelines 
In 2011, the Bank of Ghana (BoG) undertook to bring most types of MFIs under a uniform regulatory 
framework (revised in 2013)45 by establishing a four-tier classification of MFIs and their respective 
registration requirements as well as permissible activities. The guidelines also contain unambiguous 
rules, and procedures for establishing a MFI, opening new branches, loan disbursement and deposit 
taking. It clearly emerges that the collapse of MFIs in Ghana is also chiefly associated with violations 
of the related BoG rules and guidelines. As the Bank’s officer assigned to my study stated in a phone 
conversation, “almost 85% [of the collapsed MFIs] violated the law” which was collaborated by the 
interviewee from Double Up: “We the MFIs were not following the regulations. That brought the 
collapse” (Double Up, 2015: 6).  
 
This section seeks to demonstrate how the causes of the MFIs collapse were primarily violations of the 
BoG guidelines by analysing the crucial factors stated by the interviewees as the causes of the collapse 
of their former institutions in juxtaposition to the Bank of Ghana’s guidelines.   
 
First, in the case of Work Up, their major problem was unrestrained branching. As one of their 
competitors stated in a conversation with me, it was imaginably impossible for Work Up to do the kind 
of branch expansions they did without eating into the customers’ deposits. The former Branch Manager 
of the institution would eventually confirm this when I interviewed him. I asked whether they also had 
problem with using depositors’ funds to establish branches and he responded: “Yes, considering 26 
branches in 4 years” (Work Up, 2015: 3). The company in contravention of the BoG’s requirement of 
them to raise additional paid-up capital of GH 200, 000 for each new branch, decided to use customers’ 
deposits to buy magnificent buildings as branch offices. They instead of using their own capital used 
their liabilities. So when the panic about collapsing MFIs in Kumasi engulfed the public, as the 
interviewee said himself, although they were strong, once the depositors’ funds were not readily 
available for them to withdraw (because they had been invested in creating branches), further weight 
was added to the speculations that they were in fact crumbling. They were certainly not going to survive 
when the customers rushed to their different branches for their monies. Work Up was also giving huge 
                                                        
http://www.microcapital.org/microcapital-brief-bank-of-ghana-bog-to-raise-minimum-capital-requirements-for-
microfinance-institutions-mfis-to-240k/ . This was reiterated in their written response to me. The GHAMFIN 
representative also bemoaned on this in my interview with him. Employees of MFIs are mostly HND Holders and 
Senior Secondary School leavers. It is costly for MFIs to hire degree holders but he noted also that increasing level of 
unemployment has led to the entering of microfinance by degree holders, he said.   
45 2011 Regulation is Appendix 2, Revision in 2013 is Appendix 3.  
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loans which were not only in excess of the margin their being a MFI allowed them to give but also which 
in the words of the former Branch Manager were huge enough for even established commercial banks 
like the Ghana Commercial Bank, United Bank of Africa and even Barclays to give to single borrowers.   
 
In respect of Grow Rich, among other factors, the company collapsed because they disbursed loans to 
customers who owed different MFIs. In our conversation, the former Marketer of the company said that 
Grow Rich was sandwiched by more than four MFIs (those MFIs were operating before their Suame 
Branch –the name of the branch he was stationed) was opened. At the beginning of their operations, 
they poached some customers, registered them and took deposits from them who later also came to them 
for loans. Apparently, most of these customers were already doing business with their competitors and 
had taken loans, which were due for payment. Therefore, Grow Rich’s proposal to give them loans when 
they make deposits with them was a blessing in disguise.  
 
The only way Grow Rich could have known this was if it had the biometric software that helps to check 
potential loan applicants’ debt history with their competitors. But the software could be procured by 
only MFIs duly licensed to operate by the Bank of Ghana. However, as it turned out, the company was 
operating illegally without license from the Bank of Ghana so they ended up giving other people’s 
deposits (because that branch was opened with mainly depositors’ funds) to customers who owed other 
MFIs only for some to default, others to delay repayment until a long time. They had problems servicing 
the withdrawal demands of the customers of their earlier established branches and collapsed eventually. 
Schicks prophecy that “if [clients] over-indebtedness were left to spread [in Ghana], it would represent 
a serious risk on …. the financial sustainability of MFIs” (Schicks, 2011:1) could not have been fulfilled 
in any way better.  
 
The case of Dream Well is not different from Work Up. They in contravention of the BoG rules and 
guidelines used depositors’ funds to establish four branches in eight months. Although the BoG rules 
state that “not more than 25% of initial paid-up or additional capital for branches shall be spent on 
property, plant and equipment (capital expenditure)”46, Dream Well was establishing branches at a cost 
equivalent to their total paid-up capital of hundred and twenty thousand Ghana Cedis. Rather than 
sticking to the rule of not giving unsecured loans exceeding 5% of their paid-up capital, the company 
was giving colossal sums to the tune of twenty and thirty thousand Ghana Cedis as loans, which were 
24% and 36% of their stated capital, far in excess of the allowed 5%. As the interviewee from the 
company cried albeit belatedly, “we thought that would give us huge returns but repayment became 
problematic” (Dream Well, 2015: 2).  
 
                                                        
46 See Appendix 3  
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Finally, Double Up Microfinance Company just like the others also honoured the BoG’s rules mainly in 
the breach. The interviewee would thus yield when I pushed him on violating the Bank’s rules and 
regulations: 
Okay some of them [the problems] were managerial issues. We should 
have known that our stated capital is this and do not give loans in excess 
of our stated capital. And we were not following the BoG [Bank of Ghana] 
rules. They have stated that we should not give a single customer more 
than 5% of our stated capital. But we did. Our company did. Most of the 
companies too. Our stated capital was hundred thousand that is one 
billion old Ghana Cedis but we were giving a single client about GH10, 
000, which is 10% of our stated capital (Double Up, 2015: 3).  
 
He would later complain that “as at now we have a customer who owes us about fifty thousand [Ghana 
Cedis]. It could have taken care of about three branches. If during the crisis, we had just 50% of that 
single customer’s loan, we could have been able to solve our problem”. So I asked, “alternatively, have 
you not advanced that loan, you could have had the money to settle your problems to which he responded 
“yes. But we overlooked the policy, the BoG rules and regulations” (Double Up, 2015: 4).  
 
Another major challenge Double Up had relating to violation of the guidelines pertains to deposits. The 
BoG rules explicitly state: “the amount of a deposit transaction, including the balance on a deposit 
account at any time shall not exceed 5% of the institution’s paid-up capital”. Stated differently, the MFIs 
shall not take deposits that are 5% in excess of their stated capital. Yet, the company overlooked the 
guidelines and took deposits to the tune of eight, twelve and fifteen thousand Ghana Cedis respectively, 
which were 10%, 14% and 18% of their stated capital of one hundred and twenty thousand Ghana Cedis.  
 
The reason the Bank of Ghana proscribes MFIs from taking huge deposits which are 5% in excess of 
their stated capital is to prevent a situation where a MFI would not readily have money to timely serve 
customers because a huge depositor made a big withdrawal. That was precisely how the collapse of 
Double Up began. They experienced huge impromptu withdrawals by their big depositors at some of 
their branches, which made them delay unduly, the withdrawal requests of some of their customers for 
they had to call for cash from their mother bank, which also delayed. Some customers who became 
frustrated after waiting for a long time left for their houses, only for them to go and speculate to their 
friends that the company was collapsing for most people could not get their money, as others had to wait 
for a very long time. So the next day, fuelled by some falsehood that the company was collapsing which 
was peddled by some bitter employees dismissed for fraud, more than a double of the previous day 
number of customers beseeched the MFI, demanding to withdraw their monies. And as the interviewee 
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explained “because you have made provision not for the doubled number, you can’t satisfy the new 
batch, so they also [did] spread the news, then the speculations continued and the panic too continued” 
(Double Up, 2015: 1). The radio stations picked it up, heightening the speculation, so people rushed to 
their different branches to cash their monies. As the GHAMFIN representative submitted, “even [for] 
commercial banks, Barclays or Stanbic Bank, if 50% of its customers jump into the bank and withdraw 
their money, the bank would collapse” (GHAMFIN, 2015: 3). Therefore, Double Up eventually 
collapsed. 
 
Section 2: External factors  
The first section of the analysis pertained to internal factors but organizational failure scholars argue 
that mostly, managers are constrained by exogenous industrial and environmental constraints leaving 
them with little real strategic choice. They contend that organizations are embedded in their 
environments and therefore, external factors have more explanatory power than firm level factors in 
explaining organizations failures (McGahan and Porter 1997; Rumelt 1991). Therefore, in this section, 
we analyze two external factors namely: macroeconomic instabilities, and ‘collapse rumuors’ which also 
contributed to the collapse of the MFIs.  
 
External factor 1: Macroeconomic instability  
It was hitherto contended that MFIs operate in a market that depends more on microeconomic conditions 
than macro fluctuations. MFIs as the narratives were, inhabit their own business world47. But the 
aftermaths of the economic crisis would caution supporters of this view to revise it. Observers as well 
as practitioners have all been rudely awakened to the realization that after all, MFIs are not insulated 
from the shocks in the “real economy” – there are too many links through financial markets, credit 
conditions and the fortunes of their customers (CGAP, 2009; CSFI, 2009; 2010). The 2012 industry 
publication thus conceded: “The experience of 2009-10 has shown microfinance to be a lot more 
susceptible to macro-economic shifts than previously thought” (CSFI, 2012: 38). The operations of 
MFIs are thus subject to broader macroeconomic trends.   
 
Collapsing MFIs or Susu companies and financial service providers, (as they were then called), is not a 
recent development in Ghana. Belnye (2011) catalogues several of such instances, which occurred as 
far back as 2008. That of 2013 became headline events because they were not only widespread but also 
continual and the development is even yet to abate. The widespread collapse of MFIs in Ghana since 
                                                        
47 Marcelino San Miguel, president of Fundacion San Miguel Arcangel in the Dominican Republic, is quoted at page 30 
of the 2008 Banana Skins Publication as saying: “In the medium and long terms, MFIs operate in a market that depends 
more on microeconomic conditions than macro fluctuations, though macro trends affect everything ... But I do not believe 
that this determines the survival and operational management of a successful MFI.” 
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2013 contemporaneously happened with a serious economic crisis in Ghana for it to be sheer 
coincidence. It therefore was not surprising that macroeconomic factors prominently featured among 
the interviewees as a major cause of the collapse of their MFIs.  
 
Ghana in 2013 tumbled – all the macroeconomic fundamentals plummeted. With an election to win in 
the year before, the government commissioned a budget deficit of GH¢8.7 billion ($2billion) amounting 
to 12.0% of GDP and this would further cripple all the sectors of the economy. Growth decelerated to 
4.4%, considerably lower than the growth of 7.9% achieved in 2012 (AfDB, OECD, UNDP, 2014). The 
country’s currency, the Cedi depreciated throughout 2013, becoming West Africa’s worst performing 
currency according to Bloomberg48. Lending rate hovered around 30%. In trying to reign in the fiscal 
deficit, the government imposed new taxes, increased the thresholds of existing ones and increased 
utility tariffs, and petroleum prices. The hardship was further convoluted by power crisis. The combined 
effect of all these were heightened economic hardship and increased cost of doing business and 
borrowing. The MFIs received their fair share of the economic miasma. 
 
Acknowledging the paths by which macroeconomic trends affect MFIs, the Microfinance Banana Skins 
publications noted that it could be directly through interest rates, and general business conditions and 
indirectly, through clients who have been hit by economic difficulty or retreat from buying financial 
services (see CGAP, 2009; CSFI, 2009; 2010; 2014). Both situations occurred simultaneously and 
contributed to the collapse of MFIs in Ghana. As submitted by the GHAMFIN representative,  
 
The economy did not help in the first place. The Cedi-Dollar issue. The 
whole idea of investments - when Government was borrowing from the 
banks and the MFIs were also borrowing from the banks. The Banks will 
give the money to the government. Because the Treasury bill went up, the 
banks were not giving the money to the MFIs again. The last 2013\2014, 
it was a huge issue. Microfinance really suffered. Genuine people had 
their business collapsed. Not because they were rogues. Some of them did 
not embezzle the money. Some have gone to people as loans, some into 
real estates and it takes time to mature and the people [customers], they 
need their money, they do not have time to wait. Had the MFIs have 
support from the banks; they could have waited for the investments to 
mature (GHAMFIN, 2015: 4). 
 
Thus, not only did the continuous depreciation of the Cedi and high cost of lending crippled the MFIs 
but also the Government crowded them out of the lending market. No wonder it accumulated a colossal 
                                                        
48 Ghana’s Cedi Falls to 8-Month Low as Budget Gap Concerns Mount: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-
05-07/ghana-s-cedi-falls-to-8-month-low-as-budget-gap-concerns-mount  
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domestic debt to the tune of USD 12,569.83 million (27.33% of GDP)49. All but one of the former 
employees of the collapsed MFIs said that their banks failed them when they turned to them for help. 
The interviewee from Work Up lamented: “They failed us. We were having a mother bank but they 
failed us. If they had supported us, but they failed us” (Work Up, 2015: 3). The former employee of 
Double Up shared similar sentiments.  
 
In our case we did not even wait for the crisis, we saw it coming, so we 
applied to one of our banks. They approved to grant us the loan. We gave 
them the needed collateral and everything they wanted and even paid the 
commitment fee. They later wrote to us that they are not ready to give us 
the loan (Double Up, 2015: 2).  
 
Of course, lending to Government through lucrative treasury bills with ever skyrocketing interest is 
more rewarding and less risky than to MFIs who are on the verge of collapse. In the heat of the economic 
crisis, one surest way the MFIs could have sustained their operations was, they like the commercial 
banks could have also invested the depositors’ money in the then lucrative treasury bills. However, the 
little they had in their coffers after investing in creating branches did not stay with them for long. The 
customers who were being battered by the economic hardships were not making deposits again, they 
rather were withdrawing their savings to support family life. The former Human Resource and 
Operations Manager of Dream Well thus stated: “People had saved with us. But because of economic 
hardship, they were just making withdrawals” (Dream Well, 2015: 3). 
 
Owusu-Nuamah (2014) also found macroeconomic instability as one of the reasons for the 2013 
sporadic collapse of MFIs in Ghana. These findings effectively rebut the fertility of the claim that MFIs 
operations are not vulnerable to macroeconomic trends and affirm rather, the contrary view that there 
are too many macroeconomic links to MFIs operations – directly through financial markets, credit 
conditions, and indirectly through the (mis)fortunes of their customers. The organization failure theorists 
were thus right, external factors, largely beyond the control of managers could also account for 
organizational failures (Mellahi & Wilkinson, 2010; Mellahi & Wilkinson, 2004; McGahan, and Porter, 
1997; Rumelt 1991).  
 
External factor 2: ‘Collapse rumours’ leading to panic withdrawals  
The history of banking and finance is replete with panic and crisis. The history of the U.S. banking 
regulation for instance is largely one of government and private responses to banking panics (Calomiris 
                                                        
49 Ministry of Finance Ghana’s Public Debt Report http://www.mofep.gov.gh/?q=news251013/ghana%E2%80%99s-
public-debt-report  
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& Gorton, 1991). Not too long ago, rumours sparked panic and caused a run on a small Chinese bank. 
The Bulgarian banking sector also nearly tumbled when customers started receiving anonymous 
messages that two of the country’s biggest banks were running into bankruptcy50.  
 
Two major competing theories seek to explain bank panics – random withdrawal and asymmetric 
information theories. The first argues that panics are undesirable events caused by unexpected 
withdrawals by bank depositors associated primarily with real location-specific shocks. A panic could 
occur because in such circumstances, banks cannot honour its liabilities at par if the agents present them 
for redemption and this would increase the agents’ belief about the banks’ insolvency. In seeking to 
avoid losses, all the agents may collectively decide to redeem their claims, causing the very event they 
imagined. Panic itself can thus become a major contributing factor to the perpetuation of crisis. The 
second argues that panics are driven by depositors’ revision of their perceived risk of banks debt when 
they are uninformed about their asset portfolio values and receive adverse news about them. Here, 
depositors believe that there are some under-performing banks but cannot detect which ones may 
become insolvent. Since depositors are unable to distinguish individual bank risks, they may withdraw 
a large volume of deposits from all banks in response to a signal (Carlson, 2005; Calomiris & Gorton, 
1991).  
 
The broad point is that when people become concerned about risk to their savings, their first reaction 
generally is to withdraw their money. The issue of panic withdrawals poignantly featured among the 
reasons stated by the interviewees as the causes of the collapse of their former institutions. Sequence of 
events heightened rumours and popular speculation about the MFIs looming collapse, which then incited 
depositors to not only rush to withdraw their funds but also, discontinue making deposits. Whilst this 
experience was commonly experienced by the collapsed MFIs studied herein, the causes were not the 
same.   
 
It has been noted that when individual depositors or investors become worried about the health of 
financial institutions entrusted with their money, their attempts to protect their savings by withdrawing 
them can force otherwise healthy institutions into liquidation, and so can spread the impact of a shock 
to other institutions (Pettis, 2003; Dupont, 2005). In this case, there would be a scramble among 
investors and depositors to withdraw their money not only from the institutions at the centre of the crisis, 
but also from any institution caught up in the rumours. As argued by Dupont “contagion can occur as 
                                                        
50 What caused the run on two of Bulgaria’s largest banks? http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-
economics/21606323-what-caused-run-two-bulgarias-largest-banks-digital-rumours  
Collapse rumours spark panic and run on small Chinese bank - 
http://business.financialpost.com/news/economy/collapse-rumours-spark-panic-and-run-on-small-chinese-bank  
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bank depositors reassess the viability of other banks when they observe either suspension or bank runs 
at a nearby bank. One failure, or the possibility of failure at one institution, may be thought to reveal 
information about other potential failures even if no actual link exists between the two institutions 
(Dupont, 2005: 416).  
 
The manner in which Work Up Microfinance Company Limited collapsed falls on all fours with the 
above explanation for how financial institutions or banks could collapse. The Kumasi people considered 
Work Up and another MFI as the two biggest and most ‘credible’ MFIs in Kumasi. One of their 
competitors said the two were seen as the “mother MFIs in Kumasi”. Unfortunately, that MFI (name 
withheld) collapsed and this led to rumours that then Work Up too would be having solvency challenges. 
The former Branch Manager thus submitted: “One thing is, last year for instance, a lot of MFIs faced 
crisis. We were still standing but one MFI called [name withheld] collapsed. So when people got to 
know that [that MFI] had been in crisis, people began to come out with a lot comments that our company 
too is collapsing. Meanwhile it was strong…. they were just spreading it. Work Up is collapsing so if 
you have money at Work Up, just go and withdraw your money” (Work Up, 2015: 2). Some employees 
of the institution, seeing the increasing rate of withdrawals hinted their families and friends who had 
deposits with the company to also rush and withdraw their money and this fast-tracked the run on the 
institution. 
 
In the case of Double Up, some bitter employees dismissed for fraud began peddling falsehood that the 
company was collapsing. So the customers of that branch beseeched the company to withdraw their 
deposits. Apparently as noted earlier, the company had experienced huge impromptu withdrawals at a 
different branch that made them unable to honour the withdrawals of some customers so they told them 
to come the next day. This the interviewee said gave credence to the falsehood of the dismissed 
employees’ claim that the company was collapsing in fact and occasioned panic withdrawals when some 
radio stations too picked up the rumour. He thus submitted: 
 
Averagely the withdrawals for a day was ten thousand to twelve thousand 
Cedis. You know you are doing withdrawals around ten thousand and all 
of a sudden, it rises to thirty thousand or forty thousand. There were some 
staff among us who were caught manipulating the system and causing 
fraud…. When they were arrested and granted bail, they started spreading 
bad news about the company in the nearby villages that they were working 
with the company and it’s collapsing so they should come and withdraw 
their monies and that is when the panic withdrawals began. The radio 
stations picked it up and people thought we were collapsing and they all 
came for their money (Double Up, 2015: 1). 
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The case of Grow Rich was also related to fraud. The company had some iterant bankers (popularly 
called mobile bankers in Ghana) who went out to mobilize deposits from the customers. But some of 
them under-reported the deposits on the mobilization forms they returned to the office, although they 
had correctly recorded them in the customers’ passbooks. For instance, a mobile banker will take GH1, 
000 from a customer and record the same in the customers’ passbook but on the mobilization sheet that 
he is to send to the bank (office), he would under-record it as GH500. And the company was not doing 
regular internal auditing which could have helped them to detect this in advance. Therefore, balance 
reconciliation disputations arose when the customers went to the institution to do withdrawals or check 
their account balance. Grow Rich then paid for this with its reputation for the customers went about 
telling others that “the institution is not credible, they do not record properly when you make deposits” 
(Grow Rich, 2015: 4). Not only did this lead to some customers closing their accounts with them, 
deposits too flaked. 
 
In respect of Dream Well, upon seeing rampant withdrawals, the company decided to control it by 
insisting that for certain amounts, customers shall give them prior notice before they come to withdraw. 
However, most customers neglected this, and when the company dishonoured their cheques for failing 
to give them prior notice, they with fury ran to speculate that the MFI was having liquidity crisis. And 
this led to “panic withdrawal and it really caused us a lot”, the former HR and Operations Manager cried 
(Dream Well, 2015: 3).  
 
Pettis (2003) contends that in the world of finance, a collapse in institutional credibility is highly 
disturbing for it can quickly lead to a liquidity crisis. As noted earlier, when panic occasions, it mostly 
begins to contagiously infect otherwise healthy institutions in a spreading and self-reinforcing wave of 
panic. Banking panics are self-perpetuating, and once public trust disappears, it takes extraordinary and 
costly measures to defend the financial system. Pettis may not be far from right for as the interviewee 
from Double Up stated,  
 
For now, people in Ghana do not like microfinance especially in the 
Northern sector, Ashanti and Brong Ahafo. Even up to now those [MFIs] 
operating in the northern sector, here in the Ashanti region are suffering; 
they are still facing the panic withdrawal because the people here have 
the negative impression that for MFIs, they will run away with your 
money. So right now the deposits have reduced, they are only coming for 
withdrawals. I have met a lot of my colleagues working in other 
companies, they are complaining. Still they are sinking. They do not 
receive as much deposits as they used to (Double Up, 2015: 4 &6). 
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I did an anecdotal random sampling of people’s views on MFIs operations in Ghana and the result was 
not different from what the interviewee stated. I discussed my thesis with one Monitoring & Evaluation 
Officer of a reputable NGO sponsored by Danida Fellowship Centre to take a short course in Denmark 
and his remark about MFIs operations in Ghana was rather uncomplimentary: “But Festival, who told 
you that they collapse? They are there for short-term purposes – to make money and diversify into other 
areas. So once they mobilize enough funds from people, then they lock up their offices”. Though quite 
cynical, his view unfortunately align with the high public distrust for MFIs in Ghana because of recent 
events– public trust in them has ebbed away and even the Ghana Association of Microfinance 
Companies has also noted it 51. This reinforces Boateng & Boateng (2014) recent study finding that only 
few Ghanaians trust and have confidence in MFIs, most do not. This development bears watching! 
 
Section 3: The Bank of Ghana (BoG) monitoring challenges   
In the preceding two sections, we analysed the internal and external causes of the collapse of commercial 
MFIs in Ghana. As noted in the introductory part, the monitoring and oversight challenges of the BoG 
to identify in advance and nip illegal operations and unethical practices in the bud also contributed to 
the collapse. We analyse this as the last causal factor. Afterwards, all the causal factors would be 
summarized into a conceptual framework.  
 
The crux of the debate between the Institutionalists and the Welfarists on the future of microfinance was 
how to make it a sustainable and ubiquitous poverty reduction methodology. This required increasing 
the scope (number of individuals reached), impact (effect on the well-being of borrowers), and depth 
(ability to reach the poorest of the poor) of microfinance. The Institutionalists argued that achieving this 
magnitude of change required deposit mobilization for continued reliance on donor or government funds 
is both detrimental and unrealistic. Instead, deposit mobilization would be facilitated by 
commercialization of microfinance—MFIs becoming formal financial institutions, and commercial 
banks offering microfinance products (Hubka & Zaidi, 2005). 
 
But deposit mobilization comes at once with issues of moral hazard for as argued by Gallardo, “the 
interests of financial institutions vis-à-vis the interests of consumers per se are not necessarily 
compatible. Individual depositors and investors may not be in a position to judge the soundness of a 
financial institution (the issue of asymmetric information), much less to influence that institution’s 
management” (Gallardo, 2001: 5). There is thus the need for an impartial third party such as the state or 
one of its agencies to regulate and control the soundness of a country’s financial institutions. Such an 
                                                        
51 MFIs seek to restore shaken confidence: 
http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/business/artikel.php?ID=331368  
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impartial authority will enforce compliance by licensed financial institutions with a given legal and 
regulatory framework, because licensing implies that the financial authority is vouching for or is 
prepared to assume responsibility for the soundness of the regulated financial institution which the 
public may be dealing with. 
 
Expanding outreach thus requires increasing funding resources and exposes the limits to grants and 
donor funds. Commercial funding sources could be accessed when the policy and legal environment are 
appropriate, and only if the MFI has the appropriate legal status and financial standing. Regulation and 
supervision of MFIs was thus an integral part of the broader neoliberal strategy to develop a market 
based financial system. The hitherto existing legal and regulatory frameworks in many countries were 
seen as incapable of supporting the sustainable growth and commercial integration of microfinance 
programs into the formal financial system. So there was a push for regulatory framework under which 
microfinance can be legitimately provided by MFIs and so that a continuum of MFIs can be developed 
and strengthened (Gallardo, 2001).  
 
This brought the “tier” banking and financial system and Ghana is one of the countries that have adopted 
this system. It was contended that the future for sustainable microfinance lies in a regulated, licensed 
environment – because there is no other environment that will permit massive, sustainable delivery of 
an increasing variety of financial services to the poor to effectively link them to the more developed 
sectors of an economy (Gallardo, 2001 & Christen & Rosenberg, 2000). However, there is a growing 
view that the cumulative effect of regulatory initiatives especially in the wake of the crisis, are having 
an inadvertent permanently damaging effect on the microfinance sector (see CSFI, 2010).  
 
As part of its regulatory duties, the BoG in 2013 revised upwardly the capital requirements of MFIs in 
Ghana from hundred thousand Ghana Cedis (GH 100, 000) to five hundred thousand (GH500, 000) in 
line with the increasing level of risk incidental to providing microfinance services. However, the Council 
Chairman of the Ghana Microfinance Institutions, Network (GHAMFIN), Emmanuel Darko cited this 
among a catalogue of factors as the causes of the sporadic collapse of several MFIs in Ghana in 2013. 
He thus submitted: “the upward adjustment of the capital requirement by the Bank of Ghana became a 
challenge for some of the MFIs in the short term on how to immediately meet the minimum amount”52.  
 
When this was put to the BoG staff, they argued that such a claim could only be tenuous for not only 
could the MFIs have merged their resources, but also there were clear transitional arrangements for this. 
                                                        
52 Ghana Broadcasting Corporation: Audio recording of a speech delivered by the Council Chairman of the Ghana 
Microfinance institutions, Network, GHAMFIN, Emmanuel Darko during the 6th annual general meeting of GHAMFIN 
in Accra on November 14th, 2014.  http://gbcghana.com/1.1896605  
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They contended that the tier two MFIs per the revised regulations, have up to 30th June 2015 to raise 
GH 250,000 and at the end of June, 2016 to top it up to the required GH500, 000. The upward adjustment 
therefore could not have pressurized the MFIs to collapse, they insisted. Indeed, that claim conflicts 
with the account of Owusu-Nuamah (2014) and Addo (2014) who argue that the MFIs collapsed in spite 
of the fact that they met the minimum requirements for licensing including capitalization53. However, 
be as it may, surprisingly, this claim by the GHAMFIN Chair did not receive much traction in the 
interviews with the former employees of the collapsed MFIs. It seems it was not a factor or did not 
contribute much. Indeed as observed earlier, the MFIs had in their custody, the deposits of their clients 
to demonstrate their viability to the BoG, so the upward adjustment was never a constraining issue to 
them at all.   
 
The Bank of Ghana’s monitoring and evaluation mechanism to ensure that MFIs comply with the 
regulations is a two-pronged approach: i. Their physical presence in the institution as in on-site, to 
examine the institution’s operations. This is done annually, and based on the volume and nature of risk 
that faces the institution; ii. Through an off-site surveillance i.e. through the submission of prescribed 
returns, which give the regulator early warning signals to avert any unwarranted disturbance in the 
financial system. Currently, the Bank has started receiving prudential returns from the licensed MFIs 
(BoG, 2015). The Central Bank, in collaboration with the Ministry of Finance has been organizing series 
of financial literacy week to educate and inform the public on microfinance activities. In a bid to improve 
peer learning and sharing of best practices in the industry, the Bank also collaborates with the various 
umbrella associations (apex bodies) of the MFIs who currently play an advocacy role. The Bank 
provides them with logistical support (cars, printers and money) to aid in the regulation and supervision 
process (BoG, 2015; GHAMFIN, 2015).  
  
Commenting on supervision and monitoring deficiencies, the interviewee from Double Up faulted the 
regulator for not being able to detect when MFIs use depositors’ funds to open branches:  
 
One lapse of the Bank of Ghana is that they would demand for the stated 
capital. You have to go and deposit the money (capital) into your bank 
account, print the bank statement and bring to [them] for [them] to know 
that you have raised the stated capital to open the branch. You know the 
shareholders, what they would do is this: They will mobilize the  
depositors' money go and put it into one account, print the statement and 
                                                        
53 However, the claim by Owusu-Nuamah (2014) and Addo (2014) that the MFIs met the minimum capitalization before 
collapsing appears facile when the nuances are deconstructed. As found in this study not only were most of the collapsed 
MFIs operating illegally without license, also the monies they used to demonstrate their equity (paid-up capital) were 
mostly their depositors funds. It therefore cannot be properly claimed as Owusu-Nuamah and Addo do, that they met the 
capitalization requirement. I take this up further in the discussion. 
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go and show it to the regulators that I have raised the stated capital to 
fulfil the requirements. Meanwhile it is not their own, it is the depositors' 
money [that] they have used (Double, Up, 2015: 6). 
 
When this claim was put to the BoG Officer assigned to my study, he rebutted that the Bank’s officials 
“always catch them during on-site checks” just that they do not close them down immediately54 – they 
give them time to do the right thing. However, mostly, he added, such MFIs collapse before they could 
have time to make amends.  
 
The problem therefore appears not to be a case of excessively strict or lax regulation for although the 
Bank of Ghana is not high handed, it deals ruthlessly with MFIs who stubbornly disregard the rules and 
regulations. There have been several incidences where the Bank has closed down MFIs who after 
consistent warnings refuse to comply with the rules55. The problem is one of monitoring and oversight 
attributable to the huge number of MFIs in Ghana. As observed by the GAMC, “the huge number of 
microfinance institutions affects the ability of the oversight body– the Bank of Ghana– to efficiently 
regulate the sector”.56 This explains why the MFIs could break so many of the rules and operation 
guidelines in respect of for instance, branching and operating without license, and why Ponzi schemes 
could survive for a long time until customers are defrauded.  
 
The Bank admitted to this challenge. One staff of the Bank used this analogy to explain their challenge: 
“We are here in Accra. If somebody establishes a microfinance institution in a faraway village, until 
something happens, there is no way we could hear about it. Just like the Police Service, there is no way 
Bank of Ghana could stop all possible criminalities in advance.” To deal with this challenge, the Bank 
has outsourced some of its oversight responsibilities to the various umbrella bodies to regulate where 
possible. This reflects in the Bank’s regulation and operation guidelines published in 2011. The Bank 
does not only encourage individuals and entities engaged in microfinance to form associations but also 
hugely involve them in formulating regulatory standards and the issuance of operating license.  
 
However as noted by the GHAMFIN representative, the absence of legal backing for the umbrella 
                                                        
54 The Bank for obvious reasons use its power to close down illegal institutions sparingly. In 2008 when the Bank of 
Ghana in view of a number of incidences of sudden collapses and disappearances of Susu companies and financial service 
providers started closing down a number of them countrywide, the public including political figures accused them of 
being unnecessarily high-handed in the treatment of their constituents (See Belnye, 2011) 
55 Bank of Ghana to close down over 100 illegal microfinance companies: 
http://www.myjoyonline.com/business/2015/march-5th/bank-of-ghana-to-close-down-over-100-illegal-microfinance-
companies.php#sthash.m3ljsfCU.dpuf; Barely a month ago, the bank suspended the license of called DKM Diamond 
Micro-Finance Ltd for breach of the terms and conditions of its license.    
56 Microfinance companies back licence-freeze: 
http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/business/artikel.php?ID=327983 
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associations to sanction limits their ability to effectively peer-regulate their members alongside the Bank 
of Ghana. In view of this problem of oversight, the Ghana Association of Microfinance Companies 
(GAMC) once backed the Bank of Ghana’s move to put a limit on the number of operating permits that 
could be issued to microfinance companies57. While this may bring sanity in the sector, it could also be 
interpreted to mean a huge let-down to the microfinance movement since the idea of commercializing 
microfinance was chiefly to attract more players. 
 
Figure 2: Conceptual framework of drivers of MFIs into bankruptcy in Ghana 
So far, we have analysed the drivers of MFIs into bankruptcy in Ghana, which were categorised as 
internal factors, external factors and the BoG’s monitoring challenges. Below in the conceptual 
framework, is a diagrammatic representation of all the drivers of MFIs into bankruptcy in Ghana. 
 
Source: Author’s fieldwork  
 
As shown in the diagram, upon commercialization, many MFIs have entered Ghana’s microfinance 
sector to compete for profit and ‘serve’ poor people. However, the desire to expand outreach and increase 
market shares lead them to undertake suboptimal practices such as indiscriminate branching, offering 
unsustainable returns to customers and disregard of due diligence. Because of the increased number of 
MFIs, the BoG is not able to monitor, identify and prevent in advance, illegal operations and unethical 
practices. Some MFIs are also badly managed – the managers engage in unreasonably risky and 
improvident investments. Additionally, there is a growing distrust for/waning public confidence in MFIs 
                                                        
57 See footnote number 56.  
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in Ghana. Ghanaians are increasingly becoming distrustful of MFIs so they rush to withdraw their 
savings and discontinue transactions with them at the slightest hint of solvency challenges – whether 
founded or unfounded. All these practices and factors coupled with macroeconomic factors (such as 
increased cost of living and doing business, Cedi depreciation, spiralled inflation, decelerated growth, 
high lending rates) compositely heighten the already risky profiles of the MFIs business of providing 
microfinance services, causing them to collapse.  
 
Section 4: What happens to depositors’ funds when MFIs collapse and the rampant collapse of 
MFIs in the Ashanti Region  
In the first three sections, we analysed the drivers of MFIs into bankruptcy in Ghana. In this section, we 
ask what happens to depositors’ funds when the MFIs collapse. This is the last of the three research 
questions the thesis sought to examine. After this, we will saunter into the incidental issue of rampant 
collapse of MFIs in the Ashanti Region – the setting of the study. 
 
What happens to depositors’ funds when MFIs collapse? 
One of the crucial developments that came with the commercialization of microfinance is the 
authorization of MFIs to mobilize or intermediate funds from the public (Gallardo, 2001). The 
Institutionalists loudly complained that the poor are sometimes so desperate for a safe place to keep 
their savings that they even pay collectors to hold their deposits safely, thus realizing a negative return 
on their savings (Robinson, 2001). Yet, except where mandatory savings are conditional to receiving 
loans, mobilization of local savings was normally not a significant part of the then poverty lending 
approach to microfinance. So, microfinance should be commercialized to legitimize MFIs to offer the 
much in- demand savings services that provide savers with security, liquidity and returns, which the 
poor are in dire need of (Robinson, 2001; Rhyne, 1998). 
 
However, Neef (2014) argue that what he noticed in his 20 years’ experience in international 
development is that “development – wherever it takes place – always creates winners and losers”.  He 
therefore urged critical development scholars “to pay particular attention to those at the losing end of 
development.”58 Therefore, the study sought to find out if the development of providing savings services 
for poor Ghanaians through microfinance creates any losers when the MFIs collapse. Not long ago, as 
stated elsewhere, a MFI called Lord Winners Microfinance Company went bankrupt and swindled over 
5000 clients who had collectively and individually saved up huge sums of money with them. I therefore 
                                                        
58 Professor Andreas Neef celebrates 20 years in international development 
http://www.arts.auckland.ac.nz/en/about/news/news-2014/11/professor-andreas-neef-celebrates-20-years-in-
international-deve.html 
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decided to find out whether this was just one painfully unfortunate incident by finding out what 
happened to the deposits of the clients of the four MFIs studied.   
 
The clients of the collapsed MFIs studied herein just like their colleagues who saved with Lord Winners 
and other collapsed MFIs lost their savings.  The interviewees from Double Up, Grow Rich and Dream 
Well said that they could not refund the customers monies to them. Even the few who were fortunate 
could not get full refund because the companies did not have enough funds. In the case of Work Up, the 
interviewee said some of the clients who had huge deposits took them to court and the court froze a few 
of their movable assets but the value of the assets could not even defray the monies they owed them. So 
I asked, “What about the petty traders who saved with you”? He answered: “They were all silent. They 
could not do anything”.   
 
To put the matter into perspective, Work Up alone, as at December 2013 boasted of having over 500,000 
customers and as the interviewee stated, in their operations, they targeted mostly, petty traders, charcoal 
sellers and people with little money. So it could be validly assumed that a huge chunk of their clients 
were poor people and they definitely were the ones who “were silent and could not do anything” for 
poor people generally do not have the required resources to mount litigations in court. There is no 
deposit insurance in Ghana, so these poor customers have irretrievably lost their working capital, little 
savings and their sources of livelihood – their businesses are likely to collapse, which further predisposes 
them to indebtedness and consequentially, impoverishment. The rather sad situation of the poor clients 
is palpably in direct contrast to the neoliberals claim that commercialization would aid MFIs to offer 
poor people savings services that provide savers with security, liquidity and returns (Robinson, 2001; 
Rhyne, 1998). 
 
What was monumentally outrageous is that like the Wall Street CEOs, the designers of the global 
economic crisis who went home with huge bonuses while their victims were chased out of their 
mortgaged houses onto the cold streets, the owners of the MFIs went home with their assets unscathed, 
virtually – after losing outrageous number of poor clients, their life savings.  They still kept the assets – 
the buildings and premises used as offices, the furniture, plants, cars, landed properties and most of the 
illiquid assets into which they invested the customers’ funds59.  None of the former employees of the 
supposedly ‘bankrupt’ MFIs said their assets were liquidated. Not only the assets, but also crucially, 
except Grow Rich, which was operating illegally, all the other collapsed MFIs still have their operation 
licenses intact. As they stated, the Bank of Ghana has not issued them “red card” yet. So when the dust 
settles, they are unhindered – they could easily jump back into business again. The interviewee from 
                                                        
59 The interview from Dream Well is now into hire purchase and he operates from one of the defunct company’s offices 
in Adum, the central business district.  
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Grow Rich even hinted that the directors of the defunct company are now back in business with a 
different brand name.  
 
This raises a serious concern about the manner the Bank of Ghana handles the issue of collapsed MFIs. 
Why must MFIs operators who could not refund poor clients savings that they recklessly misapplied 
still retain their licenses and the assets of the companies deemed to have gone bankrupt?  
 
The pervasiveness of MFIs collapse in the Ashanti Region  
This would be the last item to be touched in chapter four. As was independently confirmed by the 
stakeholders, the Ashanti Region is where MFIs collapse most in Ghana. Pricked by this, I decided to 
pry into why it was so. Two main perspectives emerged from the conversations I had with the 
stakeholders. First, how MFIs are managed in the Region, Kumasi particularly was said to be different 
from other parts of Ghana. The claim was that the Asantes (one of Ghana's major ethnic groups) who 
dominate the Region and Kumasi in particular, are business minded and risk-taking people who like 
trading a lot. They go into business with their ‘get rich quick’ attitude and it thus explains why they 
could roll-out costly products and sporadically create branches just to endear customers to their 
institutions without looking at the long-term implications of such unduly risky endeavours.  
 
This way of explaining the pervasiveness of MFIs collapse in the Region without recourse to the 
composition of the managements of the MFIs is hugely problematic. The fact that Asantes dominate 
Kumasi or the Region does not mean that every MFI in the Region is owned and run by Asantes. Again, 
MFIs employ people from all walks of life who could be of any ethnic descent and the employees play 
instrumental roles in the operations of the MFIs. That, the Asantes embark on risky ventures with their 
“get rich attitude” is one of the stereotypical emblems tagged them by other ethnic groups. Stereotyping 
is common in Ghana but there is yet any empirical study, which proves that any of the stereotypes is 
actually true.   
 
The second reason cited was the attitude of the people towards microfinance. While Ghanaians are 
generally distrustful of MFIs, I was told the level of distrust in Kumasi is exceedingly high. One 
interviewee stated: “The people here are very sentimental. Whenever they hear of something, then they 
will all be coming to you” (Double Up, 2015:6). Thus, they easily follow rumours up with panic 
withdrawal. However, restricting this argument to the Asantes alone is quite misleading for Kumasi is 
highly cosmopolitan. Although dominated by Asantes, people from other ethnic groups are well 
represented in the city. Customers of MFIs therefore may necessarily not be ethnic Asantes. Second, 
people generally would not be dilatory in withdrawing their monies from banks when they hear that 
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they may collapse. Therefore, to associate panic-withdrawal with only Asantes’ is to commit faulty 
reductionism and attribution.  
 
Other reasons were also rooted in history. In the 1980’s, Ghana suffered the worst large-scale financial 
scam ever witnessed in the recent history of the country called the Pyram Scandal,60 where a number of 
Ghanaians lost their deposits to a fraudulent and unsustainable pyramid deposit scheme, thereby 
engendering public mistrust in the financial sector, especially for non-bank financial institutions. The 
worst sufferers were the people in the Ashanti Region and Kumasi in particular – several people in the 
Region lost huge sums. Is it the case that the horrendous memory of this scam is still lingering around, 
which makes the people highly distrustful of non-bank financial institutions? However convincing this 
may sound, it would still need an ethno-sociological enquiry to confirm it.    
 
One explanation that nearly explains the situation is the argument that the people in the Region got the 
whole microfinance concept wrongly. As the interviewee from Dream Well stated: “We didn’t 
understand the microfinance business. In Kumasi, once someone is working with microfinance, then he 
leaves a few years after to establish their own. Most of the MFIs that have collapsed, the owners were 
working with other MFIs” (Dream Well, 2015: 4). The GHAMFIN interviewee also shared a similar 
view. This explanation was captured in Owusu-Nuamah, (2014). He argues that the people took the 
microfinance business as a trade where people moved on to establish their own after a few months of 
training without paying attention to the analysis and consequences of the decisions they were taking. 
However, Owusu-Nuamah (2014) concluded that such MFIs collapse not because they are in Kumasi 
or any other part of Ghana or run by ethnic-Asantes but because the owners and operators had inadequate 
knowledge on the dynamics in the industry. Further studies are certainly needed to unravel the causes 
of the rampant collapse of MFIs in the Region.  
  
The chapter analysed the causes of MFIs collapse in Ghana. It was found that the problem primarily 
relates to unduly risky, unethical and illegal practices, mismanagement and disregard of due diligence 
which when convoluted by external factors like macroeconomic instabilities and panic withdrawals, 
push the risk levels of MFIs beyond the point of containment.  The rather grotesquely sad situation is 
that poor clients disproportionately bear the brunt of the collapse, whereas MFI operators go home with 
their assets unliquidated. Clearly, poor clients are the major sufferers of MFIs collapse in Ghana. In the 
next chapter, we discuss the contributions of these findings to the theoretical and conceptual literature 
on the subject as well as their implications for policy.   
                                                        
60 Gov't To Reopen PYRAM http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=28815  
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CHAPTER 5:  CONCLUSION 
Contributions of findings to literature and implications for policy  
The thesis sought to investigate why contrary to the Institutionalists expectation, commercial MFIs 
could collapse using the recent rampant collapse of commercial MFIs in Ghana as reference point. Two 
sub-questions were set on that: 1. Does the problem pertain to MFIs operations and strategies to survive 
competition or other internal factors? 2. Is it a problem of regulation and supervision and/or other factors 
external to the MFIs? Inherent in the questions was the assumption that the collapse could be 
endogenously or exogenously caused. The third question pertained to what happens to the customers 
deposits when the MFIs collapse.  In this section, we among other things, discuss what the Ghana case 
contributes to the broader theoretical and conceptual literature on the subject and the implications of the 
findings for public policy.   
 
The conceptual framework (figure 1) in Chapter 2 indicated that MFIs fiercely competing among 
themselves could squeeze margins, erode profitability and eventually lead to bankruptcy. This 
conceptualization was premised on the noted fact in the literature that there are many microfinance 
service providers. Therefore, the assumption (which has support in basic economics) was that the 
increased number of players providing identical products to homogenous clients would lead to squeezed 
margins and thereby undermine profitability and institutional self-sustainability. However, as it turned 
out, the evidence from the information gathered did not support this. The collapse of the MFIs were 
related to risk not to reduced profit margins (see figure 2). Contrary to opinion, the widespread sprouting 
of MFIs in Ghana has not affected profitability. Thus, the collapse of MFIs in the country is not because 
the increased number of MFIs is eroding profit margins. This implies that the Ghanaian case does not 
conform to the trend of institutional bankruptcy resulting from eroding profitability because of increased 
competition. It rather exemplifies the NIE’s argument that when incentives are embodied in profitability, 
actors could be led towards inefficient outcomes.    
 
The issue with MFIs managers breaking laws, disregarding due diligence, taking bad, unethical and 
unduly risky decisions just to expand outreach and increase market shares fits into the larger 
conversation of “overtrading” identified among MFIs in Ghana. “Overtrading in MFIs occur when they 
expand their operations too quickly or aggressively by opening up new branches in hopes of increasing 
profits by expanding customer base and attracting more deposits” (Addo, 2014:4). Here as noted by the 
BoG, visibility is confused with viability. The incidental problem is that the MFIs tend to misapply 
capital when they open up new branches by diverting working (and mostly depositors’) capital to 
complete. They as noted by Owusu-Nuamah (2014) therefore end up unable to meet depositors’ 
withdrawal requirements timely, and on-demand because of insolvency. Such situations create the 
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attendant problems of panic withdrawals that may cause MFIs failure, as was the case of the collapsed 
MFIs studied herein. Some studies (e.g., Nair & Fissha, 2010; Hayder, 2002; Bank of Ghana, 2007; 
Ghartey, 2007 –see Addo, 2014) have observed that a high percentage of MFIs in Ghana fail in the first 
five years of operation, often as a result of overtrading and financial strain. This study firmly 
collaborates that finding for none of the MFIs in this study survived beyond five years.  
 
Related here are questionable managerial decisions including huge investments in uneconomic ventures. 
Such practices mostly do not only beg due diligence but also as noted earlier, violate the rules and 
guidelines of operations set by the BoG. What flows from this is that the MFIs depart from their lanes, 
terms, and conditions of their license by giving loans and taking huge deposits in excess of what the law 
allows them. At issue here are not just economically improvident decisions, disregard of due diligence 
and/or violation of laws, but the MFIs essentially push into business areas that they do not have the right 
skills and management tools for. But as Addo (2014) noted, “the size of the sheep can never be equal to 
the size of the elephant even if it aims at multiplying its size through overeating” (p.6). MFIs are never 
designed as commercial financial intermediaries, so once they started behaving like commercial banks, 
it was only a matter of time for them to collapse. As the interviewee from Work Up admitted, it was 
“like having bitten more than you could chew, your jaws will pain” (Work Up, 2015: 2).  
 
The utility of the NIE theory for explaining the collapse was limited for it only accounted for the internal 
factors that were related to competition. However, as found in the study, external factors like 
macroeconomic instability and collapse rumuors also crucially contribute to the collapse of MFIs. This 
is consistent with the organization failure literature61  claim that not only internal but also, external 
factors that managers have less control of could account for organizational failure (Mellahi & Wilkinson, 
2010; Mellahi & Wilkinson, 2004). In the findings, one thing was consistent and true of the collapse of 
all the MFIs – something facilitated the collapse. The common factor was ‘collapse rumours’ leading to 
panic withdrawals. One surest way by which any financial institution could collapse is if the agents 
collectively decide to redeem their claims, all of a sudden. It is called panic withdrawal. However, people 
do not just panic-withdraw, something generally activates it.  
 
                                                        
61 The organization failure literature made incursions into mainstream strategic management and organization studies 
only recently. Two main schools of thought provide competing explanations for the causes of organizational failures. On 
the one hand, classical industrial organization (IO) and organization ecology (OE) scholars assume a deterministic role 
of the environment and argue that managers are constrained by exogenous industrial and environmental constraints 
leaving them with little real strategic choice, and hence managers’ role should be ignored. On the other hand, the 
organization studies (OS) and organizational psychology (OP) literature takes a more voluntaristic perspective and argues 
that managers are the principal decision makers of the firm and, consequently, their actions and perceptions are the 
fundamental cause of organizational failure. However, there is an increasing attempt to integrate both perspectives (See 
Mellahi & Wilkinson, 2010; Gillespie & Dietz, 2009; Mellahi & Wilkinson, 2004; McGahan and Porter 1997; Rumelt 
1991 for detailed discussions) 
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As found in this and other studies, there is a growing public mistrust for MFIs in Ghana. So, the slightest 
suspicion lead customers to protect their savings by seeking to withdraw them. And once the MFIs had 
used their deposits imprudently to create branches and buy illiquid assets, they certainly were not going 
to be able to timely honour the numerous withdrawal requests, thereby leading to the fulfilment of the 
depositors’ belief that the MFIs were in fact collapsing. Flowing from this, whilst acknowledging the 
instrumental role the 2013 macroeconomic instability played in the collapse of MFIs in Ghana, it appears 
to me and I contend accordingly that, it only contributed to the huge number and the pervasiveness of 
the collapse – the macroeconomic problems were necessarily not part of the root causes.  
 
What then are the overall causal findings or answers to the research questions?  We take seriously the 
view that any attempt to explain organizational failure will not be complete unless the interplay between 
contextual forces and organizational dynamics are taken into account (Mellahi & Wilkinson, 2010). 
However, sometimes, as noted by Gillespie & Dietz (2009), and this is true of the findings of this study, 
the “locus of control for the failure could be internal to the organization, even though the context for the 
failure may involve external influences” (p.129). The core argument here is that failure is primarily 
caused by internal factors even though, external threats may exacerbate it.  
 
The MFIs against basic principles of financial intermediation, improvidently invested depositors’ funds 
in creating branches, illiquid and other assets which were irrelevant to their operations; they offered 
costly and unsustainable products; broke the rules of their operations and disregarded basic standards of 
due diligence, all in the name of increasing outreach and market shares.  Certainly, they were sowing 
the seeds of their own destruction by increasing the risk profiles of their already risky business of 
providing microfinance services. This is line with Gillespie & Dietz (2009) observation that organization 
failure is “a single major incident, or cumulative series of incidents, resulting from the action (or 
inaction) of organizational agent” (p. 128). Clearly, the MFIs “shot themselves in the foot” as contended 
by Owusu-Nuamah (2014).   
 
But as rigorously argued by Thomas Hobbes in his time-honoured theory of Leviathan, if people on 
their own would do the right thing, then there will be no need for institutions and laws. This issue even 
becomes more serious when raised in tandem with the critical question of what happens to the 
depositors’ funds after the collapse of the MFIs. As shown in the analysis, the cost of the collapse is 
disproportionally borne by the poor.  Materially, the actual harm arising from the collapse is not borne 
by the owners and employees themselves rather, by the customers – the poor people and the wider 
(microfinance) community. Generally, organizational decision makers are assumed to be rational and 
committed to acting in the firm’s best interest but the facts after the global financial crisis and the 
evidence uncovered in this study clearly negate this. It seems the MFIs operators would not take their 
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moral responsibility to be prudent with people’s money seriously and would need to be whipped to 
comply as urged by Hobbes. 
 
 The imposed duty on the Bank of Ghana is to regulate and protect the public from Ponzi schemes, 
unscrupulous people and financial institutions as well as protect consumers and investors funds from 
being (mis)applied by MFIs operators on unduly risky ventures. However, as found in this study, the 
Bank has an oversight challenge to constantly monitor and prevent illegal and unethical activities timely 
and in advance.  The question then is: What is the implications of the findings of this study for policy, 
in dealing with the problem of collapsing MFIs and its attendant problems in Ghana, taken into 
consideration the Bank of Ghana’s inability to constantly monitor and nip illegal operations and 
unethical practices in the bud before the bubble bursts?  
 
One thing I learnt from the former Marketer of the defunct Dream Well Microfinance Company who 
now works with a savings and loans institution is that knowing that, the Bank of Ghana field monitors 
could come and check them impromptu, they are always careful to organize their affairs. The Bank of 
Ghana may therefore consider creating in the other regions of Ghana, subsidiaries of the OFISD, which 
is now centralised in only Accra to enhance nationwide monitoring.  Relatedly, devolution of sanction 
powers to the (umbrella) associations of the MFIs who generally have offices and personnel scattered 
around the country compared to the Bank of Ghana may be helpful. With such powers, the MFIs 
associations could peer-regulate alongside the Bank of Ghana and further enhance knowledge sharing 
and learning of best practices.  
 
Second, the Bank and the Ministry of Finance financial literacy campaign must be intensified and not 
only in the urban towns but also the rural areas where the people who generally because of their level 
of literacy and location, easily become the targets of unscrupulous people and Ponzi schemes.  
 
Third, the current state of affairs where poor customers irretrievably lose their savings but owners of 
MFIs deemed as collapsed still retain the assets of the (purportedly) defunct companies is grossly 
inequitable. Why should customers who have no hands in the collapse of the MFIs lose their savings 
only for the owners to go home with booties? Poor customers could come together for mass action but 
the duty is on the Bank of Ghana to follow every report and rumour on collapsed MFIs – whether 
licensed or unlicensed, audit them and liquidate their assets to pay off depositors just as they intended 
to do when the rumour of DKM Microfinance Company came up recently62.   
 
                                                        
62 BoG turns down appeal of DKM microfinance customers: http://citifmonline.com/2015/06/02/bog-turns-down-
appeal-of-dkm-microfinance-customers/#sthash.gN43e8PI.dpuf 
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Fourth, criminal prosecution of MFI operators who recklessly play with poor people’s money must begin 
in earnest to serve as deterrence. There is also an urgent need for deposit insurance. This would not only 
protect clients when their MFIs collapse but also the strict conditions attached to insurance would make 
MFI operators become provident in their operations since insurance companies are unlikely to pay for 
their unconsidered recklessness.  
 
The previous studies on the collapse of MFIs in Ghana, especially Owusu-Nuamah (2014) and Addo 
(2014) have some lapses that need to be pointed out before we close the curtains. Even though this study 
benefited immensely from the insightful contributions they make to the knowledge on MFIs collapse in 
Ghana, some of their claims fall short of empirical test. For instance, both studies claim that most of the 
MFIs met the capitalization, staffing and other requirements of the BoG before collapsing. The problems 
with their claim squarely lies with the methodology they used for their studies – Owusu- Nuamah’s 
study was observational whilst that of Addo was conceptual.  
 
But whether or not the MFIs in fact met the capitalization and other requirements of the BoG is an 
empirical question. The eminent scholars might have been led to that erroneous conclusion by the fact 
that the involved MFIs, prior to their collapse, were not closed down on grounds of non-fulfilment of 
capital and other requirements by the BoG. However, as unraveled in this study, the collapsed MFIs did 
not only use depositors’ funds to demonstrate their capital unethically; some too were operating illegally 
without license. Most of them were even caught by the BoG for violating the requirements just that, the 
Bank did not close them down immediately only for them to collapse later. Clearly, the claim that the 
MFIs met the BoG’s capitalization and other requirements before collapsing is empirically 
unsustainable.  
 
Conclusion  
The thesis was instigated by the collapse of profit – accumulating commercial MFIs contrary to the 
Institutionalists’ claim that competition and profitability incidental to commercialization would make 
MFIs financially self-sustainable. Attempting to explain the contradiction with competition and 
profitability leading to institutional demise contrary to the neoliberals’ expectation of self-sustainability, 
perspectives from the NIE literature were extracted to indicate how actors could be led to undertake 
sub-optimal practices when profitability is embedded in competition – the very nature of the new wave 
microfinance model proposed by the Institutionalists. The study mounted to compare both surviving and 
collapsed MFIs. However, problems with accessing the surviving MFIs led to the alteration of the 
research design to focus on only collapsed MFIs.  
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The causal factors of MFIs collapse in Ghana were grouped into internal and external factors and the 
monitoring challenges of the Bank of Ghana. Even though the context of the collapse involved external 
influences like collapse rumuors and macroeconomic factors, the loci of the collapse were internal to 
the MFIs and manifested as indiscriminate branching, offering of unsustainable packages, disregard of 
due diligence, mismanagement and violation of the BoG’s rules and guidelines.  
 
The unduly risky manner in which operators of MFIs (mis)apply investors and customers’ funds bring 
into question their moral responsibility to be cautious with poor people’s money and this explains the 
growing public distrust for MFIs in Ghana. The MFIs themselves have recognized the aversion of the 
public to their operations. However, going forward, to trust that, that in itself or alone would bring 
providence in their operations would be a too expensive optimism. The monitoring challenges of the 
Bank of Ghana is seriously noted but the evidence points to more compliance and ethical operations 
when MFIs tails are tightly held to do so.   
  
Accordingly, the study recommends a two-pronged strategy to tackle the issue of collapsing MFIs and 
its attendant problems in Ghana. The first strategy is risk-averting/reduction oriented and includes 
progressive decentralization of the Other Financial Institution Supervision Department of the Bank of 
Ghana and legal empowerment of the MFIs associations to peer-regulate alongside the BoG in order to 
timely and in advance identify and prevent unethical and illegal operations everywhere in Ghana. The 
second strategy is oriented towards protecting MFIs clients and the public from unscrupulous people 
and financial institutions. The recommended measures include introduction of deposit insurance, 
intensification of financial literacy campaign, tracking of reports and rumuors of MFIs collapse–whether 
licensed or unlicensed, to audit them and liquidate their assets to pay off depositors as well as criminal 
prosecution of unscrupulous people who recklessly misapply microfinance clients and investors funds 
on unduly risky ventures.  
 
One institution-related factor that was shockingly least emphasized in this study is corruption. 
Corruption among MFIs staff was noted in Owusu-Nuamah (2014) and Addo (2014) to have played a 
significant role in the 2013 mammoth collapse of MFIs in Ghana. This they argued was due to weak 
internal controls, bad accounting software and poor supervision. Nevertheless, in this study, the issue of 
corruption on its own did not feature much among the causes of the collapse of the MFIs studied herein. 
Was it because all the interviewees were former staff and the phenomenon is associated with staff of 
MFIs? Perhaps, the responses on it would have been different if the interviewees were former owners 
of collapsed MFIs.  
 
 
What Drives Commercial Microfinance Institutions into Bankruptcy in Ghana?  
 
65 | P a g e  
 
The insufficiency of this study to explain the pervasiveness of MFIs collapse in the Ashanti Region – 
the setting of the study is duly acknowledged. Further studies are urged into that. Additionally, despite 
its appositeness to the study, the NIE theory could not explain the contributions of the external factors 
to the collapse, hence the incorporation of the organization failure theory to supplement it so the 
phenomenon could be holistically explained. The above notwithstanding, the overall findings of the 
study provide an explanatory reference or benchmark for examining what drives commercial MFIs into 
bankruptcy in Ghana. 
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